by Doug Bandow at http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/america-constitutional-republic-when-can-president-kill
The U.S. has been fighting the “war on terrorism” for
more than a decade. Thousands of Americans have died, both in the 9/11
attacks and Washington’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Constitution
also is under assault, as successive presidents have asserted
extraordinary and unreviewable power in the name of combating terrorism.
Washington even has turned targeted killing—or assassination—into
routine practice. U.S. SEALs are used when the job needs to be close and
personal, like the mission against Osama bin Laden. But drones have
become the tool of choice, widely used in Pakistan, Yemen, and
elsewhere.
This new form of warfare raises fundamental questions for a
democratic, constitutional republic. International law bars arbitrary
killing. Domestic law further restricts the execution of U.S. citizens.
Moreover, promiscuous assassinations move foreign policy into the
shadows, reducing the opportunity for a full public debate over issues
of war and peace.
In traditional conflict the opposing sides are reasonably clear. Not
so in the “war on terrorism.” Is this fight traditional war, law
enforcement, or a new hybrid? If the latter, what rules apply? What
should be done if there are no obvious battlefields and no certain
combatants? Should propagandists be treated as fighters? Are any
procedural protections required before a U.S. citizen can be killed?
These issues ended up in federal court in August 2010 when Nasser
al-Aulaqi filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the
Obama administration from killing his son, Anwar al-Aulaqi. The latter,
an American citizen living in Yemen, had been added to a federal “kill
list” four months before. Judge John Bates dismissed the lawsuit on
procedural grounds, ruling that Nasser al-Aulaqi lacked “standing” to
sue and the so-called “political doctrine” prevented the court from
deciding the issue. Last September Anwar al-Aulaqi was killed by a
Predator drone.
The Constitution is the fount of authority for the national
government and protects Americans even when they are overseas. The 4th
Amendment regulates the seizure of citizens, who are to be “secure in
their persons.” The 5th Amendment mandates that no one can “be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Other
constitutional provisions cover prosecuting traitors and imposing bills
of attainder (the former requires the testimony of two witnesses; the
latter is prohibited).
The Alien Tort Statutes and Torture Victim Protection Act also bar
arbitrary killing. Moreover, this principle has been incorporated into
customary international law. Admittedly, “many norms of international
law are vague and even border on the vacuous.” Nevertheless,
international law reinforces domestic legal restrictions on killing
American citizens.
Limits on government are necessary to preserve a liberal democratic
order and protect individual liberty. These constraints are most
important where state power is most extreme and its consequences are
most significant. Like killing people. In 2004 the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions
observed: “Empowering governments to identify and kill ‘known
terrorists’ places no verifiable obligation upon them to demonstrate in
any way that those against whom legal force is used indeed are
terrorists, or to demonstrate that every other alternative has been
exhausted.”
So can the U.S. government kill its own citizens, like al-Aulaqi?
Ryan Alford, a professor at Ave Maria School of Law, observed: “It is
beyond peradventure that the Framers never intended to invest the
president with the power to order a citizen’s execution without trial.”
Yet police sometimes shoot and kill without trial. Doing so is legal,
but requires a powerful justification. The same principle applies to
combating terrorism.
The U.S. government may prosecute citizens for many reasons.
Committing treason, for instance. Supporting organizations which
threaten the U.S. Perhaps even for serving as propagandists for
America’s avowed enemies. But none of these activities would warrant
secretly placing the person’s name on a “death list,” especially without
a conviction or other adjudication of guilt by an objective body. Even
Jeh Johnson, the Department of Defense General Counsel, observed that
simply embracing al-Qaeda’s ideology would not be enough.
In contrast, joining enemy armed forces and fighting U.S. forces
would allow the U.S. government to target a U.S. citizen. But Anwar
al-Aulaqi was living in Yemen where no U.S. troops were fighting, unlike
in Afghanistan and Iraq, had joined the equivalent of a gang rather
than an army, and was not involved in traditional combat.
Nor did the authorization to use military force adopted by Congress
after 9/11 cover al-Aulaqi. The resolution authorized the president to
use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those who “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 attacks in order to “prevent
future acts of terrorism.” As such, the AUMF targeted al-Qaeda and those
who attacked America a decade ago. Al-Aulaqi did not leave the U.S.
until 2002, settling in Yemen two years later.
Outside of active combat, especially in a declared war, when can
Washington kill American citizens? Only if the government can
demonstrate a compelling interest subject to what the U.S. Supreme Court
terms “strict scrutiny.” That means the targeted citizen must pose an
imminent threat to life (or threaten serious physical injury) and
killing him or her must be a last resort.
International law embraces similar concepts. One is
proportionality—such as responding to a threat to life. Another is
necessity—which reflects imminence and last resort. Also considered is
precaution—which requires planning to limit the recourse to lethal
force. Thus, under both domestic and international law, the American
government can execute people, including American citizens, only for the
most important of reasons and when there is no reasonable alternative
to doing so.
Were these criteria met in the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi?
The administration insisted they were. It called him chief of
operations for al-Qaeda in Yemen. It said he personally instructed a
suicide bomber in 2009. It claimed he was “intimately involved in the
attacks that have come closest to hitting the United States.” It
contended that he had a “direct role in supervising” the attempt to send
mail bombs to America. It asserted that he pushed al-Qaeda (Yemen) to
attack the U.S., something he “said publicly was his goal.”
If these allegations are true, al-Aulaqi threatened the lives of
Americans. One could imagine someone joining a completely ineffective
terrorist-wannabe group, which might not justify a deadly U.S.
government response. However, while al-Qaeda (Yemen) thankfully so far
has achieved little practical success, it is not for want of trying.
Washington should not be restricted to playing defense, hoping to always
be lucky in foiling new terrorist plots. By his conduct al-Aulaqi
created a presumptive danger to America.
However, the government was not attempting to preempt any particular
plot. Was the threat imminent, especially since names apparently are
entered on the “kill list” for months or years, without apparent regard
to potentially changed circumstances?
Regarding al-Aulaqi Cato Institute Chairman Robert Levy said bluntly:
“The imminent-threat contention isn’t credible.” There is no obvious
reason why it was necessary to kill al-Aulaqi on September 30, 2011
versus October 30 or November 30. Indeed, only rarely is the government
likely to have reliable knowledge of an upcoming plot of the sort
necessary to demonstrate “imminence” in a particular case.
Nevertheless, membership in a hostile, violent terrorist group
engaged in an ongoing campaign to harm Americans arguably creates a
substitute form of imminence. In essence, al-Aulaqi’s actions shifted
the burden of proof. Take a leadership role in a group dedicated to
attacking Americans and you can be presumed to pose an imminent threat
to kill or commit great bodily harm. Membership in al-Qaeda (Yemen)
joined intent with action.
Finally, was assassination a last resort—could al-Aulaqi have been
captured? The U.S. government has successfully prosecuted other
individuals for terrorist activities. Trying instead of killing
al-Aulaqi would have showcased America’s commitment to the rule of law.
But it obviously is easier to capture a fugitive in the United
States, where the government (at whatever level) has full authority.
Even with the cooperation of foreign governments, it is much more
difficult to grab someone overseas, especially if he or she has friends
in the local police, military, or intelligence services. In fact, even
attempting to capture someone might require a significant military
operation. It would be ironic if the Constitution was interpreted to bar
use of a drone to kill a person while justifying a large foreign
expedition to capture the same person.
In short, if the administration’s claims were true, the al-Aulaqi
killing probably met constitutional requirements. However, simply saying
it is so does not make it so. My Cato Institute colleague Julian
Sanchez warned of the tendency to treat such assertions “as ironclad
facts rather than contestable inferences from necessarily patchy
data—even though the past decade should have made it abundantly clear
that analysts sometimes get it wrong.”
Washington policymakers have commonly relied on discredited
intelligence claims. Consider the catastrophic war against Iraq. The
credibility of foreign sources must be weighed. Competing intelligence
must be balanced.
Indeed, this is why trials are held on criminal charges: juries
assess witness credibility and compare conflicting claims. In the case
Yaser Esam Hamdi vs. Donald H. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court even
ruled that “a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant
[must] be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis
for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.” It would be ironic
if it was easier to kill than imprison a U.S. citizen.
Administration claims regarding al-Aulaqi have been challenged.
Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen specialist, contended: “Certainly, Aulaqi was a
threat, but eliminating him is not the same as killing Osama bin
Laden.” Johnson pointed out that al-Aulaqi was not the head of al-Qaeda
(Yemen), in charge of military operations, or even the organization’s
top religious scholar.
Explained Johnsen: “Rather, he is a mid-level religious functionary
who happens to have American citizenship and speak English. This makes
him a propaganda threat, but not one whose elimination would do anything
to limit the reach of the Qaeda brand.” Indeed, added Johnsen, “Mr.
Aulaqi’s name may be the only one Americas know, but that doesn’t make
him the most dangerous threat to our security.”
How to decide the truth about al-Aulaqi and others like him? The
administration apparently produced a 50-page memo citing his operational
role in a group viewed as a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda. Washington
also contended that his capture was impracticable. What was reasonable
and due process, the administration added, had to be determined by
consequence.
These are reasonable arguments. But allowing the president and his
aides to compile “kill lists” in secret with no charges filed, no
outside review of evidence, and no oversight of decisions should leave
every American more than uncomfortable. Unreviewable and unaccountable
power is inconsistent with a constitutional republic.
Events like 9/11 may justify expanding government power. However,
officials still must be held accountable for their use of that power.
Yet in cases like al-Aulaqi there is no accountability so long as the
government is careful to assert arguments which offer a constitutional
justification for targeted killings—that the person posed an imminent
threat which could be dealt with no other way—and the courts refuse to
exercise oversight.
Even if the president can get away with acting unilaterally, he
should not do so. The administration could create a formal process with
internal checks and balances. Afsheen John Radsan and Richard Murphy, of
the William Mitchell School of Law and Texas Tech University School of
Law, respectively, argued that “the government must take reasonable
steps based on individualized facts to ensure accuracy before depriving
any person of life, liberty, or property,” but suggested that this
requirement “might be satisfied by independent, intra-executive review.”
In fact, Jeh Johnson contended: “Within the executive branch the views
and opinions of the lawyers on the president’s national security team
are debated and heavily scrutinized.”
However honest such an internal review, it is not enough. In the case
of al-Aulaqi, the administration should have released its decision
memo. It need not reveal any sensitive intelligence. But the
government’s arguments should be available for public review.
Chicago Tribune
columnist Steve Chapman complained that the president “saw no need to
bother” to make the case that al-Aulaqi “posed a clear threat to
American lives and that the missile was the only feasible way to avert
it.” The president should have made the case.
Moreover, the nation’s founders created a system with numerous checks
and balances to constrain government irrespective of who was in office.
Argued Robert Levy: “The separation of powers doctrine, if it means
anything, stands for the proposition that citizens cannot be killed on
command of the executive branch alone, without regard to the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.” Institutionalizing stricter safeguards is imperative
today, with the new forms of warfare which has come to dominate U.S.
policy.
Electronic surveillance of foreign powers and their agents, which
could include Americans, posed a similar challenge. In 1978 Congress
passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FISA allows
surveillance of foreign parties without a court order, but requires a
warrant, through a special court which hears the case in secret, when
Americans are involved.
Congress should create a similar process for targeted killings.
Legislators should establish special National Security Courts to grant
formal Assassination Warrants. The government would have to demonstrate
that a serious threat was imminent and there was no reasonable
alternative to a targeted killing. Judges would be trained to assess
intelligence claims. A warrant would allow the government to place a
name on an official “kill list.” The warrant would sunset after a period
of time—six months, perhaps—after which the government would have to
return to court to renew the warrant.
Admittedly, “assassination warrants” would seem grotesque in a free
society. The fact that the threat of terrorism has generated new forms
of war which undercut Americans’ liberty provides another reason to
rethink an interventionist foreign policy which encourages terrorism.
Promiscuous intervention by Washington has left the U.S. less secure in
recent years. An activist foreign policy also is undercutting America’s
heritage of liberty.
As long as Washington responds to terrorism with extreme
countermeasures, such as targeted killings, new procedures are
necessary. At least judicial review would force the government to make a
proffer of proof to someone independent of the executive branch.
Moreover, specialized training would enable jurists to ask the right
questions. Executive authority might remain excessive and subject to
abuse, but it would no longer be essentially limitless.
Osama bin Laden and his fellow terrorists have lost the war on
terrorism. However, their attacks have transformed the U.S., threatening
the liberties as well as lives of Americans. There is no greater
government power than to order someone’s death.
In killing Anwar al-Aulaqi the administration may have acted
constitutionally. But even if so, it did not act consistently with a
free society. Congress should create additional safeguards.
Americans must never forget that we are securing a democratic
republic, a system based on protecting individual liberty. If we fail to
preserve the freedoms which make America unique and worth defending,
the terrorists truly will have won.