hab·i·tat ˈhabəˌtat/ noun: The natural environment of an organism, the place that is natural for the life and growth of an organism; the natural home or environment of an animal, plant, or other organism.
Seems straightforward, right? Unless, of course, you’re the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which in its role administering the Endangered Species Act (ESA) classified land where a species doesn’t live and can’t survive as “critical habitat” that is “essential” to the survival of that species. Yes, FWS redefined basic terms in the English language and designated a parcel of land in Louisiana as critical habitat for the “dusky gopher frog,” despite the parcel’s utter unsuitably for sustaining the frog’s life cycles.
When the Weyerhaeuser company challenged the FWS designation, first the district court and then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied Chevron—the doctrine whereby courts give hands-off treatment to agencies when they interpret statutes—and deferred to the agency’s rule. This, even though Chevron itself doesn’t allow “arbitrary and capricious” interpretations.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-has-opportunity-shut-down-federal-land-grab
2018-05-21
Cato: Wisconsin’s Butter Scheme Is Udderly Cheesy
Minerva Dairy, based in Ohio, is America’s oldest family-owned cheese and butter dairy. It has been producing artisanal, slow-churned butter in small batches since 1935. They have gotten along by selling via their website and regional distributers in several states. This model has worked fine everywhere except Wisconsin, which requires butter manufacturers to jump through a series of cumbersome and expensive hoops to sell butter inside the state.
Of course, Wisconsin is America’s Dairyland, with many large dairy producers who naturally want to limit their competition. At the behest of these large producers, the state requires every batch of butter sold in the state to be “graded” by a specifically state-licensed grader—all of whom live in Wisconsin, except for a handful in neighboring Illinois—who must taste-test every single batch. Because Minerva’s butter is produced in multiple small batches over the course of each day, the law would effectively require the dairy to keep a licensed tester on-site at all times, which is cost-prohibitive. The state admits that the grading scheme has nothing to do with public health or nutrition, but claims that its grades—based largely on taste—inform consumers.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wisconsins-butter-scheme-udderly-cheesy
Of course, Wisconsin is America’s Dairyland, with many large dairy producers who naturally want to limit their competition. At the behest of these large producers, the state requires every batch of butter sold in the state to be “graded” by a specifically state-licensed grader—all of whom live in Wisconsin, except for a handful in neighboring Illinois—who must taste-test every single batch. Because Minerva’s butter is produced in multiple small batches over the course of each day, the law would effectively require the dairy to keep a licensed tester on-site at all times, which is cost-prohibitive. The state admits that the grading scheme has nothing to do with public health or nutrition, but claims that its grades—based largely on taste—inform consumers.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wisconsins-butter-scheme-udderly-cheesy
2018-05-20
Cato: Democrats Ask Trump Administration to Block Consumer Protections
In a recent letter to the Trump administration, leading congressional Democrats ask the administration not to allow protections for enrollees in short-term health plans.
Yes, you read that right. Dated April 12, the letter comes from Sens. Patty Murray (WA) and Ron Wyden (OR), as well as Reps. Frank Pallone (NJ), Bobby Scott (VA), and Richard Neal (MA), each the top Democrat on a different congressional committee with jurisdiction over health care. They ask the administration to withdraw in its entirety a proposed rule that, if implemented, would offer significant protections to enrollees in so-called “short-term limited duration plans.”
The administration has proposed lengthening the maximum term for such plans from 3 months to 12 months, which had been the limit for nearly two decades before the Obama administration shortened it. The administration has also asked for public comments (due April 23) on whether it should allow insurers to offer short-term plans with “renewal guarantees”—a consumer protection that allows enrollees who develop expensive illnesses to continue paying low, healthy-person premiums.
The letter asks the administration to “withdraw the proposed rule in its entirety,” which would block those consumer protections. These Democrats literally want to prevent short-term plans from giving consumers the peace of mind from knowing they will be covered for an entire year. Worse, these Democrats want to prohibit short-term plans from offering a consumer protection that protects the sick from premium spikes.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/top-democrats-ask-trump-administration-block-consumer-protections
Yes, you read that right. Dated April 12, the letter comes from Sens. Patty Murray (WA) and Ron Wyden (OR), as well as Reps. Frank Pallone (NJ), Bobby Scott (VA), and Richard Neal (MA), each the top Democrat on a different congressional committee with jurisdiction over health care. They ask the administration to withdraw in its entirety a proposed rule that, if implemented, would offer significant protections to enrollees in so-called “short-term limited duration plans.”
The administration has proposed lengthening the maximum term for such plans from 3 months to 12 months, which had been the limit for nearly two decades before the Obama administration shortened it. The administration has also asked for public comments (due April 23) on whether it should allow insurers to offer short-term plans with “renewal guarantees”—a consumer protection that allows enrollees who develop expensive illnesses to continue paying low, healthy-person premiums.
The letter asks the administration to “withdraw the proposed rule in its entirety,” which would block those consumer protections. These Democrats literally want to prevent short-term plans from giving consumers the peace of mind from knowing they will be covered for an entire year. Worse, these Democrats want to prohibit short-term plans from offering a consumer protection that protects the sick from premium spikes.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/top-democrats-ask-trump-administration-block-consumer-protections
2018-05-19
Cato: South Dakota Is Taxing the Constitution
Despite over a century of Supreme Court decisions holding that a state cannot force wholly out-of-state entities to collect taxes for them, South Dakota wants to do just that. In 2017, South Dakota passed Senate Bill 106, which attempts to force out-of-state sellers that ship to South Dakota residents to collect and remit South Dakota’s sales tax. The law is in direct contravention to the 1992 case of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, which held that states could not compel any entity to collect taxes unless the entity has a physical presence within the state. South Dakota sued Wayfair, a popular home goods vendor, among other retailers, in an attempt to enforce their law and overturn Quill in the process.
South Dakota’s law is at odds with the Constitution. Quill’s physical-presence requirement stemmed from decades of developments in tax law that struck an important balance between due process and the Commerce Clause of our Constitution. Due process requires some definite link—some minimum contacts—between the state and any person, property, or transaction that a state seeks to tax or regulate. Wayfair does not own property in South Dakota, elects no representatives in South Dakota, and was afforded no protection by South Dakota’s police. South Dakota’s only justification for binding a foreign entity to its law is that some of Wayfair’s many customers happen to live there. To allow South Dakota to compel Wayfair’s collection of its state taxes raises serious concerns of taxation without representation. If states can directly compel people who live outside state boundaries to adhere to state standards—standards the people had no chance to influence—the concept of statehood itself is undermined.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/south-dakota-taxing-constitution
South Dakota’s law is at odds with the Constitution. Quill’s physical-presence requirement stemmed from decades of developments in tax law that struck an important balance between due process and the Commerce Clause of our Constitution. Due process requires some definite link—some minimum contacts—between the state and any person, property, or transaction that a state seeks to tax or regulate. Wayfair does not own property in South Dakota, elects no representatives in South Dakota, and was afforded no protection by South Dakota’s police. South Dakota’s only justification for binding a foreign entity to its law is that some of Wayfair’s many customers happen to live there. To allow South Dakota to compel Wayfair’s collection of its state taxes raises serious concerns of taxation without representation. If states can directly compel people who live outside state boundaries to adhere to state standards—standards the people had no chance to influence—the concept of statehood itself is undermined.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/south-dakota-taxing-constitution
2018-05-18
Cato: This Blogpost Isn’t Authorized by the Supreme Court
Can the government force private parties to speak against their own interests and disparage the products they offer? The answer is yes when potential consumer harms are significant (think tobacco labels and other safety warnings) or there’s informational asymmetry (securities offerings)—and indeed fraudulent offerings (the prototypical snake oil) are prohibited altogether. But mandated disclosure regimes are proliferating far past these sorts of traditional disclosures, stretching the First Amendment to the breaking point regarding commercial speech.
A recent example of this phenomenon involves Nationwide Biweekly Administration, whose business is saving customers a significant amount on their mortgages by structuring smaller biweekly payments in place of traditional monthly payments—allowing for an extra reduction of principal each year. To market its services, Nationwide uses public information to send potential customers mailers illustrating how much they might save over the life of their loans. Despite front-and-center statements that Nationwide is “not affiliated, connected, or associated with, sponsored, or approved by the lender listed above,” California decided that this information was insufficient to guarantee that consumers wouldn’t be confused. The state required the company to state on solicitations that they are “not authorized by the lender.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/blogpost-isnt-authorized-supreme-court
A recent example of this phenomenon involves Nationwide Biweekly Administration, whose business is saving customers a significant amount on their mortgages by structuring smaller biweekly payments in place of traditional monthly payments—allowing for an extra reduction of principal each year. To market its services, Nationwide uses public information to send potential customers mailers illustrating how much they might save over the life of their loans. Despite front-and-center statements that Nationwide is “not affiliated, connected, or associated with, sponsored, or approved by the lender listed above,” California decided that this information was insufficient to guarantee that consumers wouldn’t be confused. The state required the company to state on solicitations that they are “not authorized by the lender.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/blogpost-isnt-authorized-supreme-court
2018-05-17
Cato: The IRS Took the Road Less Traveled By, Yet Judges Still Made All the Deference
In 1984, George Orwell famously defined “doublethink” as “holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.” But even Orwell would blush at claims made by the Internal Revenue Service that one can somehow both follow the law and violate it with the same activity. Amazingly, this seems to be the exact argument employed against Duquesne Light Holdings and subsequently upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
In the early 2000s, Duquesne filed a series of consolidated tax returns along with its wholly owned subsidiary AquaSource. Despite initially declining to challenge the company’s deductions in a 2004 audit, the IRS later determined that the losses claimed constituted a double deduction. Even though the company painstakingly followed the tax code and regulations to the letter, the IRS relied on a strained interpretation of an 80-year-old case, Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez (1934), to disallow $199 million in losses, demanding a $36.9 million payment.
The Third Circuit’s endorsement of this odd use of Ilfeld creates a broad new view of federal agency power. Rather than understanding Ilfeld as a background presumption for evaluating ambiguous agency rules, this new doctrine allows agencies to override their own regulations to penalize those who violate some unarticulated, uncodified policy principle. Duquesne followed the rules, which did not prohibit the deductions it claimed. But rather than allowing deductions that were legally authorized, the court imposed a “triple-authorization requirement” mandating an additional okay, specifically stating that the deductions may be taken together. In other words, the court said that it isn’t enough for the law to say “you may take deduction A” and elsewhere “you may take deduction B”; the law must then also explicitly say “you may take deduction A and deduction B at the same time.”
The court’s decision continues the long march toward unrestrained administrative power via judicial abdication. First came Chevron deference, whereby courts must defer to the statutory interpretation of the agency that enforces the relevant statute. Then came Auer deference, requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations. But the Third Circuit has now gone a step further, ruling that an agency can reinterpret its own unambiguous regulations to mean whatever it wants. If Auer deference is a jurisprudential black eye, then the Third Court’s decision here is an ocular enucleation.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/irs-took-road-less-traveled-yet-judges-still-made-all-deference
In the early 2000s, Duquesne filed a series of consolidated tax returns along with its wholly owned subsidiary AquaSource. Despite initially declining to challenge the company’s deductions in a 2004 audit, the IRS later determined that the losses claimed constituted a double deduction. Even though the company painstakingly followed the tax code and regulations to the letter, the IRS relied on a strained interpretation of an 80-year-old case, Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez (1934), to disallow $199 million in losses, demanding a $36.9 million payment.
The Third Circuit’s endorsement of this odd use of Ilfeld creates a broad new view of federal agency power. Rather than understanding Ilfeld as a background presumption for evaluating ambiguous agency rules, this new doctrine allows agencies to override their own regulations to penalize those who violate some unarticulated, uncodified policy principle. Duquesne followed the rules, which did not prohibit the deductions it claimed. But rather than allowing deductions that were legally authorized, the court imposed a “triple-authorization requirement” mandating an additional okay, specifically stating that the deductions may be taken together. In other words, the court said that it isn’t enough for the law to say “you may take deduction A” and elsewhere “you may take deduction B”; the law must then also explicitly say “you may take deduction A and deduction B at the same time.”
The court’s decision continues the long march toward unrestrained administrative power via judicial abdication. First came Chevron deference, whereby courts must defer to the statutory interpretation of the agency that enforces the relevant statute. Then came Auer deference, requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations. But the Third Circuit has now gone a step further, ruling that an agency can reinterpret its own unambiguous regulations to mean whatever it wants. If Auer deference is a jurisprudential black eye, then the Third Court’s decision here is an ocular enucleation.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/irs-took-road-less-traveled-yet-judges-still-made-all-deference
2018-05-16
Cato: Ominous Trends in China
On March 11, China’s National People’s Congress made official what had been rumored for more than two weeks, voting to abolish the two-term limit on the presidency. Current president Xi Jinping is now able to serve in that post indefinitely. That decision is merely the latest in a series of ominous developments that have occurred since Xi took office in 2013.
Ending term limits significantly alters China’s political system. Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the country’s radical economic reforms beginning in the late 1970s, also implemented that crucial political reform. He and his followers did so to guard against a repeat of the horrid abuses committed during the long, tyrannical rule of Mao Zedong. And the restriction did achieve a limited success. China hardly became a democratic state, but within the context of a one-party system, Deng’s successors served more like chief executive officers, with other members of the party elite acting as a board of directors that could, and did, serve as a check on the president’s power. Removing the limit on presidential terms means that an incumbent now has abundant time to accumulate more and more personal power. The threat of strongman rule, with all its potential abuses, has returned.
As I point out in a recent article in Aspenia Online, Xi was exhibiting troubling behavior even before pushing through the legislation ending term limits. Under the guise of combatting corruption (admittedly a very real problem in China), he systematically purged officials who showed signs of independent views. There has been a troubling hardline ideological aspect to his rule as well. Xi initiated a campaign to revitalize the Party, aiming at achieving a renewed commitment to Maoist principles. Even pro-market academics felt the chill of the new political environment, with crackdowns directed against several prominent reformers, including economist Mao Yushi, the 2012 recipient of the Cato Institute’s Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/ominous-trends-china
Ending term limits significantly alters China’s political system. Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the country’s radical economic reforms beginning in the late 1970s, also implemented that crucial political reform. He and his followers did so to guard against a repeat of the horrid abuses committed during the long, tyrannical rule of Mao Zedong. And the restriction did achieve a limited success. China hardly became a democratic state, but within the context of a one-party system, Deng’s successors served more like chief executive officers, with other members of the party elite acting as a board of directors that could, and did, serve as a check on the president’s power. Removing the limit on presidential terms means that an incumbent now has abundant time to accumulate more and more personal power. The threat of strongman rule, with all its potential abuses, has returned.
As I point out in a recent article in Aspenia Online, Xi was exhibiting troubling behavior even before pushing through the legislation ending term limits. Under the guise of combatting corruption (admittedly a very real problem in China), he systematically purged officials who showed signs of independent views. There has been a troubling hardline ideological aspect to his rule as well. Xi initiated a campaign to revitalize the Party, aiming at achieving a renewed commitment to Maoist principles. Even pro-market academics felt the chill of the new political environment, with crackdowns directed against several prominent reformers, including economist Mao Yushi, the 2012 recipient of the Cato Institute’s Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/ominous-trends-china
2018-05-15
Cato: Won’t You Save Me First Amendment Grief, San Francisco?
San Francisco bans signage advertising “off-premises” activity, but not “on-premises” advertising. That is, if you own a liquor store, you can advertise the beers you have for sale, but not the upcoming beer festival you’re sponsoring across town.
But advertising is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, and if the government wants to places limits on that speech, it must adhere to the constitutional limits on its own power. A company called Contest Promotions has challenged this law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in the city’s favor, so now the company asks the Supreme Court to take its case.
At the core of the First Amendment is a principle of non-discrimination. That is, the government can place certain limits on speech in public places, but it may not preference some speakers over others based on the speech’s content or viewpoint. The content-based distinction San Francisco makes is precisely the sort of discrimination the constitution doesn’t abide. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has made something of a muddle in this area. In Central Hudson v. Public Service Commission (1980), it set forth a special test for what is “commercial” speech, such as advertising, which it deemed less protected than other speech. It did this presumably to be able to better police fraud—which isn’t protected regardless—but that led to an unworkable standard and a litigation mess that lower courts have been unable to clean up.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wont-you-save-me-first-amendment-grief-san-francisco
But advertising is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, and if the government wants to places limits on that speech, it must adhere to the constitutional limits on its own power. A company called Contest Promotions has challenged this law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in the city’s favor, so now the company asks the Supreme Court to take its case.
At the core of the First Amendment is a principle of non-discrimination. That is, the government can place certain limits on speech in public places, but it may not preference some speakers over others based on the speech’s content or viewpoint. The content-based distinction San Francisco makes is precisely the sort of discrimination the constitution doesn’t abide. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has made something of a muddle in this area. In Central Hudson v. Public Service Commission (1980), it set forth a special test for what is “commercial” speech, such as advertising, which it deemed less protected than other speech. It did this presumably to be able to better police fraud—which isn’t protected regardless—but that led to an unworkable standard and a litigation mess that lower courts have been unable to clean up.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wont-you-save-me-first-amendment-grief-san-francisco
2018-05-14
Cato: More Americans Die in Animal Attacks than in Terrorist Attacks
Comparing the risk of dying in a terrorist attack to a common household accident like slipping in the bathtub is inappropriate. After all, inanimate objects like bathtubs do not intend to kill, so people rightly distinguish them from murderers and terrorists. My research on the hazard posed by foreign-born terrorists on U.S. soil focuses on comparing that threat to homicide, since both are intentional actions meant to kill or otherwise harm people. Homicide is common in the United States, so it is not necessarily the best comparison to deaths in infrequent terror attacks. Yesterday, economist Tyler Cowen wrote about another comparable hazard that people are aware of, that is infrequent, where there is a debatable element of intentionality, but that does not elicit nearly the same degree of fear: deadly animal attacks.
Cowen’s blog post linked to an academic paper by medical doctors Jared A. Forrester, Thomas G. Weiser, and Joseph H. Forrester who parsed Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) mortality data to identify those whose deaths were caused by animals in the United States. According to their paper, animals killed 1,610 people in the United States from 2008 through 2015. Hornets, wasps, and bees were the deadliest and were responsible for 29.7 percent of all deaths, while dogs were the second deadliest and responsible for 16.9 percent of all deaths.
The annual chance of being killed by an animal was 1 in 1.6 million per year from 2008 through 2015. The chance of being murdered in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil was 1 in 30.1 million per year during that time. The chance of being murdered by a native-born terrorist was 1 in 43.8 million per year, more than twice as deadly as foreign-born terrorists at 1 in 104.2 million per year. The small chance of being murdered in an attack committed by foreign-born terrorists has prompted expensive overreactions that do more harm than good, such as the so-called Trump travel ban, but address smaller risks than those posed by animals.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/more-americans-die-animal-attacks-terrorist-attacks
Cowen’s blog post linked to an academic paper by medical doctors Jared A. Forrester, Thomas G. Weiser, and Joseph H. Forrester who parsed Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) mortality data to identify those whose deaths were caused by animals in the United States. According to their paper, animals killed 1,610 people in the United States from 2008 through 2015. Hornets, wasps, and bees were the deadliest and were responsible for 29.7 percent of all deaths, while dogs were the second deadliest and responsible for 16.9 percent of all deaths.
The annual chance of being killed by an animal was 1 in 1.6 million per year from 2008 through 2015. The chance of being murdered in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil was 1 in 30.1 million per year during that time. The chance of being murdered by a native-born terrorist was 1 in 43.8 million per year, more than twice as deadly as foreign-born terrorists at 1 in 104.2 million per year. The small chance of being murdered in an attack committed by foreign-born terrorists has prompted expensive overreactions that do more harm than good, such as the so-called Trump travel ban, but address smaller risks than those posed by animals.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/more-americans-die-animal-attacks-terrorist-attacks
2018-05-13
Cato: Qualified Immunity: The Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and Police Accountability
Our primary federal civil rights statute, colloquially called “Section 1983,” says that any state actor who violates someone’s constitutional rights may be sued in federal court. This remedy is crucial not just to secure relief for individuals whose rights are violated, but also to ensure accountability for government agents. Yet the Supreme Court has crippled the functioning of this statute through the judge-made doctrine of “qualified immunity.” This doctrine, invented by the Court out of whole cloth, immunizes public officials even when they commit illegal misconduct unless they violated “clearly established law.” That standard is incredibly difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to overcome because the courts have required not just a clear legal rule, but a prior case on the books with functionally identical facts.
In Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2017), the Tenth Circuit used qualified immunity to shield three police officers who brutally killed an innocent man in his home. The officers had no probable cause to think Samuel Pauly had committed any crime, but they stormed his home with guns drawn and shouted that they had him surrounded—yet failed to identify themselves as police. Mr. Pauly and his brother reasonably believed they were in danger and retrieved two guns to defend themselves. After his brother Daniel fired two warning shots to scare away the unidentified attackers, Samuel was shot dead by one of the officers—Ray White—through the front window of his home.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/qualified-immunity-supreme-courts-unlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability
In Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2017), the Tenth Circuit used qualified immunity to shield three police officers who brutally killed an innocent man in his home. The officers had no probable cause to think Samuel Pauly had committed any crime, but they stormed his home with guns drawn and shouted that they had him surrounded—yet failed to identify themselves as police. Mr. Pauly and his brother reasonably believed they were in danger and retrieved two guns to defend themselves. After his brother Daniel fired two warning shots to scare away the unidentified attackers, Samuel was shot dead by one of the officers—Ray White—through the front window of his home.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/qualified-immunity-supreme-courts-unlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability
2018-05-12
Cato: Keeping Russia’s Electoral Misdeeds in Perspective
Concerns about Russia’s apparent interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election are becoming deeper and more widespread. The latest episode was the indictment of 13 Russian nationals as a result of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation. The indictments allege that those individuals operated an internet “troll farm” producing propaganda to exacerbate America’s political and social divisions. The alleged goal was to weaken Hillary Clinton’s electoral prospects (as well as those of Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio) and strengthen those of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.
If such activities occurred with the approval of Vladimir Putin’s government (as is likely the case) Moscow has committed a serious breach of diplomatic norms. However, angry Americans need to keep the offense in perspective. The social media propaganda campaign was surprisingly crude and amateurish. Even the Mueller indictment conceded that there is no evidence the efforts of the Russian trolls changed even a small number of votes, much less altered the outcome of the presidential contest.
However, as I point out in a recent National Interest Online article, the reaction in some American political and media circles to the “Russian meddling” scandal, even before the latest revelations, was shrill to the point of outright hysteria. The most egregious manifestation is the determination of some critics of the Trump administration to compare Moscow’s behavior to an act of war akin to Pearl Harbor and 9-11.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/keeping-russias-electoral-misdeeds-perspective
If such activities occurred with the approval of Vladimir Putin’s government (as is likely the case) Moscow has committed a serious breach of diplomatic norms. However, angry Americans need to keep the offense in perspective. The social media propaganda campaign was surprisingly crude and amateurish. Even the Mueller indictment conceded that there is no evidence the efforts of the Russian trolls changed even a small number of votes, much less altered the outcome of the presidential contest.
However, as I point out in a recent National Interest Online article, the reaction in some American political and media circles to the “Russian meddling” scandal, even before the latest revelations, was shrill to the point of outright hysteria. The most egregious manifestation is the determination of some critics of the Trump administration to compare Moscow’s behavior to an act of war akin to Pearl Harbor and 9-11.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/keeping-russias-electoral-misdeeds-perspective
2018-05-11
Cato: Constitutional Defects Big Enough to Drive a (Food) Truck Through
Imagine that it’s your first day at a new job. As you endure the tedious onboarding process, an interesting tidbit catches your attention; among the perks of your new position, you will be issued a company car and cell phone. “Sweet!” you exclaim, now more confident than ever of having made the right career move. But your enthusiasm drops precipitously as you learn that GPS devices have been installed on both the car and phone, allowing the company to continuously track your location. And your shock turns to horror when you are informed that the (mandatory) use of these items requires that you consent to the police having unfettered access to the resulting information, thus waiving your Fourth Amendment rights. While commenting on what a huge mistake accepting the position was on your way out the door, HR drops perhaps the biggest bombshell of all: “Sorry you feel that way, but it’s the city’s rule, not ours, and every other company in the field has the exact same rules… so good luck finding another job!”
Incredibly, such a dystopian scenario could become commonplace if the City of Chicago has its way.
LMP Services is a company owned by Laura Pekarik, who has operated the “Cupcakes for Courage” food truck since 2011. About a year after starting her business, Chicago passed ordinances requiring food trucks to install GPS trackers and to refrain from operating within 200 feet of established restaurants. LMP then sued to prevent enforcement of these laws—and is capably represented by our friends at the Institute for Justice.
While this case ostensibly involves food trucks in Chicago, if the Fourth Amendment fails to protect against laws like these, then there is very little to prevent cities and states across the country from extending similar regulations to virtually any other disfavored economic activity. In erroneously ruling that these requirements don’t involve an unreasonable search and don’t intrude on any liberty interests, the Illinois Appellate Court employed two lines of reasoning.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/holes-illinois-courts-logic-are-big-enough-drive-food-truck-through
Incredibly, such a dystopian scenario could become commonplace if the City of Chicago has its way.
LMP Services is a company owned by Laura Pekarik, who has operated the “Cupcakes for Courage” food truck since 2011. About a year after starting her business, Chicago passed ordinances requiring food trucks to install GPS trackers and to refrain from operating within 200 feet of established restaurants. LMP then sued to prevent enforcement of these laws—and is capably represented by our friends at the Institute for Justice.
While this case ostensibly involves food trucks in Chicago, if the Fourth Amendment fails to protect against laws like these, then there is very little to prevent cities and states across the country from extending similar regulations to virtually any other disfavored economic activity. In erroneously ruling that these requirements don’t involve an unreasonable search and don’t intrude on any liberty interests, the Illinois Appellate Court employed two lines of reasoning.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/holes-illinois-courts-logic-are-big-enough-drive-food-truck-through
2018-05-10
Cato: An Executive Office Doesn’t Become a Judicial One Simply by Changing Its Name
In sports—including the current Winter Olympics in South Korea—the concept of the “home field advantage” is pervasive. But in government, separating powers among three branches is supposed to protect individual liberties when the government pursues someone for an alleged legal infraction.
Well, Raymond Lucia felt that the Securities and Exchange Commission had such an advantage when he was fined $300,000 and barred from working as an investment adviser after an SEC administrator determined that he had misled prospective clients in a quasi-judicial proceeding that the SEC investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated without any appreciable oversight.
Lucia fought the SEC, because the agency’s administrative law judges (ALJs) are, in fact, “officers” of the SEC and not mere employees, meaning that under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, they should have been appointed by and be accountable to the president or a department head. As the Supreme Court held in a similar challenge to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in 2010, “if any power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.” The president has a duty to ensure the law is faithfully executed, and to do so he must be able to remove those officers who fail to uphold their duties.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit deadlocked over the issue of whether ALJs are executive officers and thus subject to the removal power. As it stands, they’re protected from control by the electorate because the president currently lacks the ability to remove ALJs who abuse their powers or otherwise act badly. Cato supported Lucia’s successful petition for Supreme Court review. Now we file on the merits, ahead of oral argument.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/executive-office-doesnt-become-judicial-one-simply-changing-its-name
Well, Raymond Lucia felt that the Securities and Exchange Commission had such an advantage when he was fined $300,000 and barred from working as an investment adviser after an SEC administrator determined that he had misled prospective clients in a quasi-judicial proceeding that the SEC investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated without any appreciable oversight.
Lucia fought the SEC, because the agency’s administrative law judges (ALJs) are, in fact, “officers” of the SEC and not mere employees, meaning that under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, they should have been appointed by and be accountable to the president or a department head. As the Supreme Court held in a similar challenge to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in 2010, “if any power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.” The president has a duty to ensure the law is faithfully executed, and to do so he must be able to remove those officers who fail to uphold their duties.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit deadlocked over the issue of whether ALJs are executive officers and thus subject to the removal power. As it stands, they’re protected from control by the electorate because the president currently lacks the ability to remove ALJs who abuse their powers or otherwise act badly. Cato supported Lucia’s successful petition for Supreme Court review. Now we file on the merits, ahead of oral argument.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/executive-office-doesnt-become-judicial-one-simply-changing-its-name
2018-05-09
Cato: The Russian Danger
Last week Robert S. Mueller III, the special counsel, indicted 13 Russians for intervening in the 2016 United States election. Two of the charges - buying political advertisements and mandatory disclosure - bear on free speech.
Much of the indictment documents activities during the election that would be both normal and protected by the Constitution if undertaken by American citizens. The defendants bought political advertisements, staged political rallies, and even “posted derogatory information about a number of candidates,” Hillary Clinton in particular. Lacking all scruples, they are said to have “solicited and compensated real U.S. persons to promote or disparage candidates” which means paying an actress to impersonate Hillary Clinton in jail. The defendants tried to create “political intensity through supporting radical groups, users dissatisfied with [the] social and economic situation and oppositional social movements.” Overall the Russians hoped “to sow discord in the U.S. political system.”
As it happens, all this activity may be illegal because the Russian government supported these activities. The Federal Election Commission concisely explains regulation 110.20: , “The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibits any foreign national from contributing, donating or spending funds in connection with any federal, state, or local election in the United States, either directly or indirectly.” The Commission notes that this ban “was first enacted in 1966 as part of the amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), an “internal security” statute. The goal of the FARA was to minimize foreign intervention in U.S. elections by establishing a series of limitations on foreign nationals.” FARA also required agents of foreign principals to register with the federal government presumably, as the indictment says, so “the people of the United States are informed of the source of information and the identity of persons attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy, and law.” (It should also be noted that the defendants are charged with several counts of fraud and identity theft).
These two parts of the law establish different rules for different audiences. Voters in an election are prohibited from hearing speech funded by a foreign power. Arguably, they are prevented from hearing any speech by an employee of a foreign government; such speech would involve indirect spending on an election. Other listeners, unnamed in the law, need not be prevented from hearing speech of foreigners “attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy, and law.” The public, apart from electoral appeals, and public officials, including above all members of Congress, may hear foreign speech assuming disclosure of its source. Voters, however, should be, and are protected from such speech.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/russian-danger
Much of the indictment documents activities during the election that would be both normal and protected by the Constitution if undertaken by American citizens. The defendants bought political advertisements, staged political rallies, and even “posted derogatory information about a number of candidates,” Hillary Clinton in particular. Lacking all scruples, they are said to have “solicited and compensated real U.S. persons to promote or disparage candidates” which means paying an actress to impersonate Hillary Clinton in jail. The defendants tried to create “political intensity through supporting radical groups, users dissatisfied with [the] social and economic situation and oppositional social movements.” Overall the Russians hoped “to sow discord in the U.S. political system.”
As it happens, all this activity may be illegal because the Russian government supported these activities. The Federal Election Commission concisely explains regulation 110.20: , “The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibits any foreign national from contributing, donating or spending funds in connection with any federal, state, or local election in the United States, either directly or indirectly.” The Commission notes that this ban “was first enacted in 1966 as part of the amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), an “internal security” statute. The goal of the FARA was to minimize foreign intervention in U.S. elections by establishing a series of limitations on foreign nationals.” FARA also required agents of foreign principals to register with the federal government presumably, as the indictment says, so “the people of the United States are informed of the source of information and the identity of persons attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy, and law.” (It should also be noted that the defendants are charged with several counts of fraud and identity theft).
These two parts of the law establish different rules for different audiences. Voters in an election are prohibited from hearing speech funded by a foreign power. Arguably, they are prevented from hearing any speech by an employee of a foreign government; such speech would involve indirect spending on an election. Other listeners, unnamed in the law, need not be prevented from hearing speech of foreigners “attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy, and law.” The public, apart from electoral appeals, and public officials, including above all members of Congress, may hear foreign speech assuming disclosure of its source. Voters, however, should be, and are protected from such speech.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/russian-danger
2018-05-08
Cato: The Trial Penalty
Have you ever heard of the “Trial Penalty”? It is among the most important features of America’s criminal justice system, and yet there is no reference to it in the Constitution, it is not taught in high school civics classes or even law schools, and most lawyers have never heard of it. Nevertheless, the Trial Penalty is the grease that keeps the massive engine of American criminal justice humming along at peak efficiency.
So what is it? Simply put, the Trial Penalty is the array of penalties, paybacks, and repercussions that are inflicted upon criminal defendants who presume to insist upon exercising their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—or what Cato Research Fellow Trevor Burrus calls “bespoke justice.”
With more than 10 million arrests last year and the world’s highest incarceration rate, America’s criminal justice system simply cannot afford to provide each and every defendant with an expensive and time-consuming jury trial. Nor do we: These days, about 95 percent of criminal convictions are obtained through plea bargains rather than jury trials. In the federal system, the numbers are even higher—more than 97 percent of convictions come from plea bargains.
Think about that for a moment. The citizen jury is the cornerstone of American criminal justice. It is a historic and hallowed institution. Why would so few people choose to invoke such a precious and fundamental right as the opportunity to challenge the government’s case in court and force the prosecutors to convince a unanimous jury (in most jurisdictions) of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
The answer is the Trial Penalty, and a recent case from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, United States v. Tigano, illustrates what a pernicious and sordid tool of injustice it is.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/trial-penalty
So what is it? Simply put, the Trial Penalty is the array of penalties, paybacks, and repercussions that are inflicted upon criminal defendants who presume to insist upon exercising their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—or what Cato Research Fellow Trevor Burrus calls “bespoke justice.”
With more than 10 million arrests last year and the world’s highest incarceration rate, America’s criminal justice system simply cannot afford to provide each and every defendant with an expensive and time-consuming jury trial. Nor do we: These days, about 95 percent of criminal convictions are obtained through plea bargains rather than jury trials. In the federal system, the numbers are even higher—more than 97 percent of convictions come from plea bargains.
Think about that for a moment. The citizen jury is the cornerstone of American criminal justice. It is a historic and hallowed institution. Why would so few people choose to invoke such a precious and fundamental right as the opportunity to challenge the government’s case in court and force the prosecutors to convince a unanimous jury (in most jurisdictions) of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
The answer is the Trial Penalty, and a recent case from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, United States v. Tigano, illustrates what a pernicious and sordid tool of injustice it is.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/trial-penalty
2018-05-07
Cato: When Corruption Is a Job Perk
I recall quite vividly the day I first witnessed the potency of the “get out of jail free” cards issued by Police Benevolent Associations. I was a teenager in the New Jersey suburbs headed to a concert with a car full of friends, and our driver was so caught up in conversation about what a great show it was going to be that, despite our feeble warning shouts, he barrelled through a solid red light going about 40 miles per hour—a red light with a police car stopped on the opposite side of the intersection. Predictably, the police car immediately flipped on its siren and tore after us. The passengers resigned ourselves to missing the start of the show. At the very least we were going to be stuck waiting through a sobriety test. The driver was surprisingly calm. He explained that he had both a card and a silver shield in the rear window identifying him as a family member of a law enforcement officer. To our astonishment, the stop was the shortest I’ve ever sat through before or since. The officer made some small talk with the driver, asked (without checking) whether his record was clean, then apologized for the delay before sending us on our way. As our friend explained on the way to the show, an ordinary paper card—the sort given to friends of police or folks who’ve made a donation to a PBA—would have been torn up after such an encounter, providing immunity for only a single minor infraction, while the family versions were permanent.
Since I don’t own a car, I hadn’t thought about these in years, until a story in the New York Post—about officers livid that the union was cutting their allotment of cards to distribute—provoked a flurry of discussion on social media. Readers who’d never heard of the practice before reacted with shock that this form of petty corruption could be so normalized that there would actually be official cards, openly distributed by police departments or their unions, for the explicit purpose of placing friends, family, and donors above the law—even if only for relatively minor infractions. The idea that family of police might get more lenient treatment was not particularly surprising, but many seemed taken aback that the practice could be so shamelessly institutionalized on such a large scale. Is there, after all, any conceivable non-corrupt reason for issuing wallet-sized cards identifying the bearer as a relative of police?
That sense of shock was, I immediately recognized, the correct reaction. As long as laws are enforced by human beings, a bit of small-scale local nepotism in the enforcement of the law is probably unavoidable. But there is something quite toxic about institutionalizing it, to the point where officers feel so entitled to special treatment for themselves and their friends and family that they express open outrage when the law is applied to them as it would be to any other citizen. Getting out of a speeding ticket may not seem like a dire threat to the rule of law—though you do have to wonder how many cardholders feel emboldened to drive intoxicated—but I think one can reasonably draw a link between this sort of petty favoritism and the more serious abuses that leave so many minority communities regarding their local police less as public servants than an occupying force.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/when-corruption-job-perk-0
Since I don’t own a car, I hadn’t thought about these in years, until a story in the New York Post—about officers livid that the union was cutting their allotment of cards to distribute—provoked a flurry of discussion on social media. Readers who’d never heard of the practice before reacted with shock that this form of petty corruption could be so normalized that there would actually be official cards, openly distributed by police departments or their unions, for the explicit purpose of placing friends, family, and donors above the law—even if only for relatively minor infractions. The idea that family of police might get more lenient treatment was not particularly surprising, but many seemed taken aback that the practice could be so shamelessly institutionalized on such a large scale. Is there, after all, any conceivable non-corrupt reason for issuing wallet-sized cards identifying the bearer as a relative of police?
That sense of shock was, I immediately recognized, the correct reaction. As long as laws are enforced by human beings, a bit of small-scale local nepotism in the enforcement of the law is probably unavoidable. But there is something quite toxic about institutionalizing it, to the point where officers feel so entitled to special treatment for themselves and their friends and family that they express open outrage when the law is applied to them as it would be to any other citizen. Getting out of a speeding ticket may not seem like a dire threat to the rule of law—though you do have to wonder how many cardholders feel emboldened to drive intoxicated—but I think one can reasonably draw a link between this sort of petty favoritism and the more serious abuses that leave so many minority communities regarding their local police less as public servants than an occupying force.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/when-corruption-job-perk-0
2018-05-06
Cato: For the Purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Does it Matter Where Your Email Is Stored?
People use email for many things: to collaborate at work, catch up with old friends, share baby pictures, or, sometimes, to coordinate the operations of an international narcotics trafficking ring. The federal government believes certain Microsoft-hosted email accounts were used for this last purpose and is demanding Microsoft provide them access to the communications stored within.
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) governs federal law enforcement’s authority to search email and other electronic records. They must obtain a warrant, subject to constraints similar to those imposed by the Fourth Amendment, and then provide an opportunity for the target company (e.g. Microsoft here) to contest the warrant.
Microsoft chose to contest the warrant in this case on the ground that the emails in question are stored on servers in Ireland, arguing that federal law enforcement may not claim jurisdiction over the entire globe. The federal government argues that the happenstance of the server’s location is invisible to the user, who, while sitting in his apartment in Manhattan (or wherever), is oblivious to whether his email server is in Galway or Yonkers. Because this is an important and recurring question, the Supreme Court decided to step in and sort the matter out.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/purposes-fourth-amendment-does-it-matter-where-email-stored
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) governs federal law enforcement’s authority to search email and other electronic records. They must obtain a warrant, subject to constraints similar to those imposed by the Fourth Amendment, and then provide an opportunity for the target company (e.g. Microsoft here) to contest the warrant.
Microsoft chose to contest the warrant in this case on the ground that the emails in question are stored on servers in Ireland, arguing that federal law enforcement may not claim jurisdiction over the entire globe. The federal government argues that the happenstance of the server’s location is invisible to the user, who, while sitting in his apartment in Manhattan (or wherever), is oblivious to whether his email server is in Galway or Yonkers. Because this is an important and recurring question, the Supreme Court decided to step in and sort the matter out.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/purposes-fourth-amendment-does-it-matter-where-email-stored
2018-05-05
Cato: Privatizing Federal Grazing Lands
The federal government owns 640 million acres of land—mainly in the West—which is 28 percent of land in the United States. For more than a century after the nation’s founding, the federal government aimed to sell or give away western lands to individuals, businesses, and state governments. But by the turn of the 20th century, federal policy came under the sway of progressives, who favored increased federal control.
Progressives had a misguided notion that federal ownership would be efficient and environmentally sound. Broadly speaking, they were wrong. Experience has shown that federal agencies mismanage land from both economic and environmental perspectives, as discussed here and here. The solution is to devolve ownership of most federal land to the states and private sector.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) owns about 250 million acres of land, of which about 160 million acres are used for livestock grazing. Cato scholar Steve Hanke championed BLM land privatization as an economist for President Ronald Reagan. He proposed that ranchers be allowed to buy the grazing land that they currently rent from the BLM.
Privatization would create benefits by securing property rights. Currently, ranchers are uncertain about their future access to the federal grazing lands they use, so they have incentives to overstock the lands and disincentives to make capital improvements. Privatization would allow ranchers to plan for the best economic and environmental rangeland management over the long term.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/privatizing-federal-grazing-lands
Progressives had a misguided notion that federal ownership would be efficient and environmentally sound. Broadly speaking, they were wrong. Experience has shown that federal agencies mismanage land from both economic and environmental perspectives, as discussed here and here. The solution is to devolve ownership of most federal land to the states and private sector.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) owns about 250 million acres of land, of which about 160 million acres are used for livestock grazing. Cato scholar Steve Hanke championed BLM land privatization as an economist for President Ronald Reagan. He proposed that ranchers be allowed to buy the grazing land that they currently rent from the BLM.
Privatization would create benefits by securing property rights. Currently, ranchers are uncertain about their future access to the federal grazing lands they use, so they have incentives to overstock the lands and disincentives to make capital improvements. Privatization would allow ranchers to plan for the best economic and environmental rangeland management over the long term.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/privatizing-federal-grazing-lands
2018-05-04
Cato: Colorado: Where Anyone Can Squelch Political Speech
With school board elections approaching, Tammy Holland purchased ad space in her local paper to inform her neighbors about their available options when it came time to vote. For this brazen exercise of her free speech rights, Ms. Holland found herself forced to expend considerable time and resources to defend her actions in court, twice. You might wonder how this could happen in a “free” country that ostensibly enjoys the blessings of the First Amendment. Unfortunately, Colorado’s byzantine system of campaign and political finance regulations not only turn a blind eye to First Amendment concerns, but actively incentivizes politically motivated, retaliatory litigation.
Colorado is unique in being the only state to effectively outsource enforcement of its campaign finance regulations by allowing “any person who believes” that campaign finance laws are being violated to “file a written complaint with the secretary of state.” Filing a complaint triggers a litigation process culminating in a court hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, much like a trial. After Ms. Holland was dragged into court on the whim of individuals who took issue with her speech, Campaign Integrity Watchdog (CIW)—an outside group that was not a party to the litigation—filed a motion requesting the court seal otherwise public records because they contain information related to campaign finance settlements. If the court grants CIW’s request, the public will never be able to access vital information about how these cases are resolved. In an effort to protect the public’s right to know, Cato has joined the Reason Foundation to file an objection to CIW’s motion.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/colorado-where-anyone-can-squelch-political-speech
Colorado is unique in being the only state to effectively outsource enforcement of its campaign finance regulations by allowing “any person who believes” that campaign finance laws are being violated to “file a written complaint with the secretary of state.” Filing a complaint triggers a litigation process culminating in a court hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, much like a trial. After Ms. Holland was dragged into court on the whim of individuals who took issue with her speech, Campaign Integrity Watchdog (CIW)—an outside group that was not a party to the litigation—filed a motion requesting the court seal otherwise public records because they contain information related to campaign finance settlements. If the court grants CIW’s request, the public will never be able to access vital information about how these cases are resolved. In an effort to protect the public’s right to know, Cato has joined the Reason Foundation to file an objection to CIW’s motion.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/colorado-where-anyone-can-squelch-political-speech
2018-05-03
Cato: Eighth Circuit Makes Tangled Mess of Hair Braiding Case
Readers of this blog may recall Cato’s filing an amicus brief for an appeal in the Eighth Circuit supporting two Missouri women’s challenge to state requirements that they become licensed as cosmetologists or barbers before being allowed to work as African-style hair braiders. Obtaining the mandatory license from the Missouri Board of Cosmetology & Barber Examiners entailed undergoing a minimum of 1,000 hours of mostly irrelevant training and passing an exam with both written and “practical” (term used loosely) components.
Not only is over 90 percent of the required training completely inapplicable to the practice of African-style hair braiding, but seven of the nine board members are barbers, cosmetologists, or cosmetology school owners with a direct financial incentive to limit competition.
None of that mattered to the three judges on the Eighth Circuit panel, who yesterday after a full year of foot-dragging issued a perfunctory opinion upholding the district court ruling in the board’s favor. Instead of finally providing two aspiring entrepreneurs their day in court before a neutral arbiter, this ruling continues the pattern of courts’ violating bedrock due-process principles by rubber-stamping occupational regulations under the flimsiest of rationales.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/eighth-circuit-makes-tangled-mess-hair-braiding-case
Not only is over 90 percent of the required training completely inapplicable to the practice of African-style hair braiding, but seven of the nine board members are barbers, cosmetologists, or cosmetology school owners with a direct financial incentive to limit competition.
None of that mattered to the three judges on the Eighth Circuit panel, who yesterday after a full year of foot-dragging issued a perfunctory opinion upholding the district court ruling in the board’s favor. Instead of finally providing two aspiring entrepreneurs their day in court before a neutral arbiter, this ruling continues the pattern of courts’ violating bedrock due-process principles by rubber-stamping occupational regulations under the flimsiest of rationales.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/eighth-circuit-makes-tangled-mess-hair-braiding-case
2018-05-02
Cato: Oregon Returns One of Two Kids It Seized From Low-IQ Couple
Amy Fabbrini and Eric Ziegler of Redmond, Oregon have not been accused of abuse or neglect, and “both have standard high school diplomas,” reported Samantha Swindler in The Oregonian this summer. But the state of Oregon deems their IQs to be too low and has seized their two sons in what has turned into a four-year battle.
I was a guest in August on Glenn Beck’s radio show to discuss the case. The Blaze summarizes:
"Essentially, the state doesn’t have to prove anything definite to take away a child; the argument is that they are going by the expert’s recommendation for what’s best just in case something could happen. In Fabbrini’s case, her estranged father has told authorities that she is an unfit mother; however, people closer to her have vouched for her ability to parent.
“If they [authorities] want to take your child, they’ve got him,” Olson said….
“It’s been called [‘worst-first’] thinking,” he explained. “If you’re in the child protection business, then, you know, everything looks like a danger. … You always think the worst possible thing could happen.”"
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/oregon-returns-one-two-kids-it-seized-low-iq-couple
I was a guest in August on Glenn Beck’s radio show to discuss the case. The Blaze summarizes:
"Essentially, the state doesn’t have to prove anything definite to take away a child; the argument is that they are going by the expert’s recommendation for what’s best just in case something could happen. In Fabbrini’s case, her estranged father has told authorities that she is an unfit mother; however, people closer to her have vouched for her ability to parent.
“If they [authorities] want to take your child, they’ve got him,” Olson said….
“It’s been called [‘worst-first’] thinking,” he explained. “If you’re in the child protection business, then, you know, everything looks like a danger. … You always think the worst possible thing could happen.”"
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/oregon-returns-one-two-kids-it-seized-low-iq-couple
2018-05-01
Cato: Not Everything Professionals Say Is “Professional Speech”
Like all states, California has licensed medical centers of every kind. One particular type, often known as a “crisis pregnancy center,” provides pregnancy-related services with the goal of helping women to make choices other than abortion. Based on opposition to these centers, the California legislature enacted a law, the FACT Act, requiring licensed clinics “whose primary purpose is providing family planning or pregnancy-related services” to deliver to each of their clients the following message: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.” But the law also creates an exception for clinics that actually enroll clients in these programs—so, in effect, the law applies only to clinics that oppose the very program they must advertise.
Several of these crisis pregnancy centers sued to block the law, arguing that it violated their First Amendment rights by forcing them to express a message to which they are opposed. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the law, holding that it regulates only “professional speech” and therefore should be reviewed under a more deferential standard, rather than the normal strict judicial scrutiny that applies to laws compelling speech. The Supreme Court agreed to review that ruling in a case called National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”) v. Becerra. Cato has filed a brief urging the justices to correct the lower court’s flawed reasoning.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/not-everything-professionals-say-professional-speech
Several of these crisis pregnancy centers sued to block the law, arguing that it violated their First Amendment rights by forcing them to express a message to which they are opposed. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the law, holding that it regulates only “professional speech” and therefore should be reviewed under a more deferential standard, rather than the normal strict judicial scrutiny that applies to laws compelling speech. The Supreme Court agreed to review that ruling in a case called National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”) v. Becerra. Cato has filed a brief urging the justices to correct the lower court’s flawed reasoning.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/not-everything-professionals-say-professional-speech
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