1. Did Trump collude with Russians who tried to influence the 2016 presidential election?
No. In Volume 1 of his report, Mueller didn’t mention “collusion,” which is not a legal term. He did, however, find that there was no evidence of a conspiracy, and he therefore exonerated Trump on that count. Still, Mueller concluded that the Russians did interfere, Trump was aware of the interference, he benefited from and encouraged the interference – e.g., Don, Jr. was eager to get and use information on Hillary Clinton – and he didn’t report the interference to the FBI. So, there was no crime and maybe no impeachable offense, but Mueller’s findings will likely inform voters regarding Trump’s fitness for office.
2. Did Trump obstruct justice by impeding either Comey’s or Mueller’s investigations?
Maybe. In Volume 2, Mueller cited numerous acts that could have frustrated both investigations. Trump fired Comey, tried to fire Mueller – but didn’t succeed because White House counsel Don McGahn refused to follow instructions – discouraged testimony, encouraged lying, and dangled (but didn’t actually offer) pardons. Given the evidence, Mueller concluded that he could not exonerate Trump from an obstruction charge. Nonetheless, Mueller would not say whether there was an indictable crime because of a written Justice Department policy that a sitting president cannot be indicted. It would be unfair to charge the president without affording him an opportunity to defend himself at trial. In other words, there may or may not have been sufficient evidence of a crime or impeachable offense; but there was clearly too much evidence to exonerate. Mueller left the criminal charge up to Attorney General Barr; and he left impeachment up to Congress.
3. Since the FBI director serves at the pleasure of the president, could Trump fire Comey at will?
Yes. There are no statutory conditions on the president’s authority to remove the FBI director. He or she serves at the will of the president. But if the president acts with “corrupt intent” – e.g., to impede an investigation into his own conduct – then he can be charged with obstruction of justice. In this instance, by Trump’s own words, he fired Comey because of “this Russian thing.”
4. But can there be corrupt intent if “this Russian thing” was not a crime?
Yes. It’s not necessary to prove an underlying crime in order to charge someone with obstructing justice. Admittedly, however, it’s more difficult to show corrupt intent if there’s no underlying crime. After all, how could Trump have obstructed justice related to the conspiracy investigation if there was no conspiracy? The short answer is that Trump’s motive might have been corrupt even if unrelated to proving his innocence. For example, he may have wanted to protect personal (e.g., family) interests, or business interests, or his political standing with voters. Or he may have wanted to frustrate an investigation into someone else’s crime; or to avoid exposure to a gray area of the law, or to non-criminal impeachment.
5. Trump cooperated with the investigation. How then could he have obstructed justice?
On one hand, Trump provided roughly one million documents; he did not invoke executive privilege; and he allowed White House counsel Don McGahn to testify. But, on the other hand, he refused to testify in person, and he provided inadequate answers to Mueller’s written questions. If time were not of the essence, Mueller would likely have used his subpoena power. Limited cooperation isn’t sufficient to preclude an obstruction charge.
6. Mueller’s report, as released, was redacted by Attorney General Barr. Were the redactions proper?
Yes. Barr followed the law, which requires that he redact grand jury testimony, classified material, items related to ongoing investigations, and details that could compromise the privacy of innocent persons. Barr committed to as much transparency as lawful, and it appears that he honored that commitment. Only a few of the redactions were grand jury related; most of the redactions involved ongoing investigations.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/mueller-report-faqs
2019-04-30
2019-04-29
Cato: Criminal Obstruction vs. Impeachable Obstruction
Earlier this month, the effort to impeach President Trump looked like a #Resistance fantasy. The release of the Mueller Report seems to have shifted the debate dramatically. This week, Democratic presidential contenders Sen. Kamala Harris and Sen. Elizabeth Warren called on the House to impeach Trump for obstruction of justice.
Is obstruction of justice an impeachable offense? Yes. It’s one of the few offenses where we have presidential precedent. Obstruction charges played a central role in two of the three serious presidential impeachment cases in American history, forming the basis for Article I of the charges against Richard Nixon, and Article II against Bill Clinton.
Should President Trump be impeached for obstruction of justice? I’m not going to answer that question here; like the cagey Mayor Pete, I’m “going to leave it to the House and Senate to figure that out.” Instead, I want to stress something that should be obvious, but tends to get lost amid the statutory exegesis in Mueller Vol. II: whether the president is guilty of criminal obstruction and whether he’s guilty of impeachable obstruction are different questions.
Summing up Article I of the case against Nixon, the 1974 House Judiciary Committee report explained that:
"President Nixon’s actions…. were contrary to his trust as President and unmindful of the solemn duties of his high office. It was this serious violation of Richard M. Nixon’s constitutional obligations as president, and not the fact that violations of Federal criminal statutes occurred, that lies at the heart of Article I [emphasis added]."
The Judiciary Committee report on the Clinton impeachment echoed that analysis a quarter-century later: “the actions of President Clinton do not have to rise to the level of violating the federal statute regarding obstruction of justice in order to justify impeachment.”
The standards are different because impeachment and the criminal law serve distinct ends and have very different consequences. “The purpose of impeachment is not personal punishment,” the Judiciary Committee emphasized in its 1974 staff report on “Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment”; instead, impeachment’s function “is primarily to maintain constitutional government.” And where the criminal law deprives the convicted party of liberty, a successful impeachment mainly puts him out of a job.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/criminal-obstruction-vs-impeachable-obstruction
Is obstruction of justice an impeachable offense? Yes. It’s one of the few offenses where we have presidential precedent. Obstruction charges played a central role in two of the three serious presidential impeachment cases in American history, forming the basis for Article I of the charges against Richard Nixon, and Article II against Bill Clinton.
Should President Trump be impeached for obstruction of justice? I’m not going to answer that question here; like the cagey Mayor Pete, I’m “going to leave it to the House and Senate to figure that out.” Instead, I want to stress something that should be obvious, but tends to get lost amid the statutory exegesis in Mueller Vol. II: whether the president is guilty of criminal obstruction and whether he’s guilty of impeachable obstruction are different questions.
Summing up Article I of the case against Nixon, the 1974 House Judiciary Committee report explained that:
"President Nixon’s actions…. were contrary to his trust as President and unmindful of the solemn duties of his high office. It was this serious violation of Richard M. Nixon’s constitutional obligations as president, and not the fact that violations of Federal criminal statutes occurred, that lies at the heart of Article I [emphasis added]."
The Judiciary Committee report on the Clinton impeachment echoed that analysis a quarter-century later: “the actions of President Clinton do not have to rise to the level of violating the federal statute regarding obstruction of justice in order to justify impeachment.”
The standards are different because impeachment and the criminal law serve distinct ends and have very different consequences. “The purpose of impeachment is not personal punishment,” the Judiciary Committee emphasized in its 1974 staff report on “Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment”; instead, impeachment’s function “is primarily to maintain constitutional government.” And where the criminal law deprives the convicted party of liberty, a successful impeachment mainly puts him out of a job.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/criminal-obstruction-vs-impeachable-obstruction
2019-04-19
Cato: Wisconsin’s Butter Grading Law Is Udderly Ridiculous
Minerva Dairy, based in Ohio, is America’s oldest family-owned cheese and butter dairy. It has been producing artisanal, slow-churned butter in small batches since 1935. It has sustained its business through their website and by selling to regional distributers in several states. This model has worked well everywhere except Wisconsin, which requires butter manufacturers to jump through a series of cumbersome and expensive hoops to sell their product.
Of course, Wisconsin is America’s Dairyland, with many large producers who (big surprise) have an interest in limiting competition. At the behest of these companies, the state requires every batch of butter to be “graded” by a specifically state-licensed grader—all of whom live in Wisconsin, except for a half-dozen in neighboring Illinois and a handful around the country that have been licensed only in the last year—who must taste-test every single batch. Because Minerva’s butter is produced in multiple small batches over the course of each day, the law would effectively require the dairy to keep a licensed tester on-site at all times, which is cost-prohibitive. The state admits that the grading scheme has nothing to do with public health or nutrition, but claims that its grades, based largely on taste, inform consumers.
The fact that Wisconsin is trying to shape the taste of butter isn’t even the most absurd part of this story. The criteria used to grade the butter are a ludicrous mad-lib of meaningless jargon not even the state’s experts understand. The law purports to identify such flavor characteristics as “flat,” “ragged-boring,” and “utensil.” (All commonplace terms spoken by consumers in dairy aisles across the nation, no doubt.) The terminology hearkens to a freshmanic—not even sophomoric—term paper on the semiotics of postmodern agrarian literature. To claim that a grade calculated with reference to udder nonsense serves the purpose of informing anyone illustrates the danger inherent in judges’ deferring to government rationales for silly laws that burden people who are just trying to make an honest living.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wisconsins-butter-grading-law-udderly-ridiculous
Of course, Wisconsin is America’s Dairyland, with many large producers who (big surprise) have an interest in limiting competition. At the behest of these companies, the state requires every batch of butter to be “graded” by a specifically state-licensed grader—all of whom live in Wisconsin, except for a half-dozen in neighboring Illinois and a handful around the country that have been licensed only in the last year—who must taste-test every single batch. Because Minerva’s butter is produced in multiple small batches over the course of each day, the law would effectively require the dairy to keep a licensed tester on-site at all times, which is cost-prohibitive. The state admits that the grading scheme has nothing to do with public health or nutrition, but claims that its grades, based largely on taste, inform consumers.
The fact that Wisconsin is trying to shape the taste of butter isn’t even the most absurd part of this story. The criteria used to grade the butter are a ludicrous mad-lib of meaningless jargon not even the state’s experts understand. The law purports to identify such flavor characteristics as “flat,” “ragged-boring,” and “utensil.” (All commonplace terms spoken by consumers in dairy aisles across the nation, no doubt.) The terminology hearkens to a freshmanic—not even sophomoric—term paper on the semiotics of postmodern agrarian literature. To claim that a grade calculated with reference to udder nonsense serves the purpose of informing anyone illustrates the danger inherent in judges’ deferring to government rationales for silly laws that burden people who are just trying to make an honest living.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wisconsins-butter-grading-law-udderly-ridiculous
2019-04-18
Cato: Cato’s Latest “Funny” Brief
“Fuct” is a clothing brand with, shall we say, a colorful name. It doesn’t take much imagination to figure out what they’re going for, and of course those who brazenly wear the clothing are fully aware of the signal it sends. Nevertheless, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decided that the American public’s fragile sensibilities should be protected from this brand, at least in some way, by denying federal trademark registration on the grounds that the brand name is “scandalous.” The PTO also has fainting couches on hand for those who need further assistance.
Here we go again. Remember “The Slants,” the Asian-American rock band who were denied a trademark based on their band name being “disparaging”? Simon Tam, the group’s lead singer, brought his case to the Supreme Court in 2017 and had the anti-disparaging law struck down unanimously. (That also resolved the PTO’s fight with the Washington Redskins.)
In Matal v. Tam, Cato and a basket of deplorable people and organizations, including political satirist P.J. O’Rourke and former ACLU president Nadine Strossen, filed a brief supporting the Slants and arguing that disparaging speech serves a valuable purpose, especially in rock music. Where would the world be without disparagingly named bands like N.W.A. or the Queers? Most importantly, the government can’t be trusted to decide what’s a slur.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/catos-latest-funny-brief
Here we go again. Remember “The Slants,” the Asian-American rock band who were denied a trademark based on their band name being “disparaging”? Simon Tam, the group’s lead singer, brought his case to the Supreme Court in 2017 and had the anti-disparaging law struck down unanimously. (That also resolved the PTO’s fight with the Washington Redskins.)
In Matal v. Tam, Cato and a basket of deplorable people and organizations, including political satirist P.J. O’Rourke and former ACLU president Nadine Strossen, filed a brief supporting the Slants and arguing that disparaging speech serves a valuable purpose, especially in rock music. Where would the world be without disparagingly named bands like N.W.A. or the Queers? Most importantly, the government can’t be trusted to decide what’s a slur.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/catos-latest-funny-brief
2019-04-17
Cato: Is This Infrastructure Really Necessary?
The United States has “at least $232 billion in critical public transportation” needs, claims the American Public Transportation Association (APTA). Among the “critically needed” infrastructure on APTA’s list are a streetcar in downtown Los Angeles, another one in downtown Sacramento (which local voters have rejected), one in Tempe, and streetcar extensions in Tampa and Kansas City.
Get real: even ardent transit advocates admit that streetcars are stupid. The economic development benefits that supposedly come from streetcars are purely imaginary, and even if they weren’t, it would be hard to describe streetcars – whose average speed, APTA admits, is less than 7.5 miles per hour – as “critically needed.”
Much of the nation’s transit infrastructure is falling apart, and the Department of Transportation has identified $100 billion of infrastructure backlog needs. (Page l – that is, Roman numeral 50 – of the report indicates a backlog of $89.9 billion in 2012 dollars. Converting to 2019 dollars brings this up to $100 billion.) Yet APTA’s “critical needs” list includes only $24 billion worth of “state of good repair” projects. Just about all of the other “needs” listed – $142 billion worth – are new projects or extensions of existing projects.
In fact, few if any of these new projects are “needed” – they are simply transit agency wish lists. For example, it includes $6 billion for phase 2 of New York’s Second Avenue Subway, but no money for rehabilitating New York’s existing, and rapidly deteriorating, subway system. Similarly, it includes $140 million for a new transitway in Alexandria, Virginia, but no money for rehabilitating the DC area’s also rapidly deteriorating Metrorail system. (In case anyone is interested, I’ve converted APTA’s project list into a spreadsheet for easy review and calculations.)
The $166 billion total on APTA’s “Project Examples” list is less than the $232 billion APTA says is needed, but even if all of the difference is “state of good repair” projects, that difference plus the $24 billion on APTA’s list doesn’t add up to what the DOT says is needed to restore transit infrastructure. This shows that even APTA doesn’t take public safety and “crumbling infrastructure” seriously.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/infrastructure-really-necessary
Get real: even ardent transit advocates admit that streetcars are stupid. The economic development benefits that supposedly come from streetcars are purely imaginary, and even if they weren’t, it would be hard to describe streetcars – whose average speed, APTA admits, is less than 7.5 miles per hour – as “critically needed.”
Much of the nation’s transit infrastructure is falling apart, and the Department of Transportation has identified $100 billion of infrastructure backlog needs. (Page l – that is, Roman numeral 50 – of the report indicates a backlog of $89.9 billion in 2012 dollars. Converting to 2019 dollars brings this up to $100 billion.) Yet APTA’s “critical needs” list includes only $24 billion worth of “state of good repair” projects. Just about all of the other “needs” listed – $142 billion worth – are new projects or extensions of existing projects.
In fact, few if any of these new projects are “needed” – they are simply transit agency wish lists. For example, it includes $6 billion for phase 2 of New York’s Second Avenue Subway, but no money for rehabilitating New York’s existing, and rapidly deteriorating, subway system. Similarly, it includes $140 million for a new transitway in Alexandria, Virginia, but no money for rehabilitating the DC area’s also rapidly deteriorating Metrorail system. (In case anyone is interested, I’ve converted APTA’s project list into a spreadsheet for easy review and calculations.)
The $166 billion total on APTA’s “Project Examples” list is less than the $232 billion APTA says is needed, but even if all of the difference is “state of good repair” projects, that difference plus the $24 billion on APTA’s list doesn’t add up to what the DOT says is needed to restore transit infrastructure. This shows that even APTA doesn’t take public safety and “crumbling infrastructure” seriously.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/infrastructure-really-necessary
2019-04-16
Cato: A Win on Student Speech in Rhode Island
The government can’t force people to promote messages they disagree with, even when – particularly when – the government actors are public university professors and the speaker is a student who needs to pass certain classes to get a degree.
William Felkner, a self-identified “conservative libertarian,” studied social work at Rhode Island College, a state school. His views unsurprisingly clashed with those of his professors, who consider the social work course – and the profession itself – to be “devoted to the value of social and economic justice.” In keeping with this philosophy, one of his professors assigned him to lobby the state legislature for a progressive bill.
Felkner refused to speak against his beliefs by lobbying in favor of progressive legislation. His term paper instead reflected his honest opinion of the bill. As a result, his professor gave him a failing grade and Felkner ultimately never completed the program.
That incident, in addition to a long string of events in which professors disparaged Felkner’s politics and tried to stifle his opinions, led him to sue the college. He argued, among several claims, that the school infringed on his right to free speech, compelled him to speak against his conscience, and placed unconstitutional conditions on his earning his degree.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/win-student-speech-rhode-island
William Felkner, a self-identified “conservative libertarian,” studied social work at Rhode Island College, a state school. His views unsurprisingly clashed with those of his professors, who consider the social work course – and the profession itself – to be “devoted to the value of social and economic justice.” In keeping with this philosophy, one of his professors assigned him to lobby the state legislature for a progressive bill.
Felkner refused to speak against his beliefs by lobbying in favor of progressive legislation. His term paper instead reflected his honest opinion of the bill. As a result, his professor gave him a failing grade and Felkner ultimately never completed the program.
That incident, in addition to a long string of events in which professors disparaged Felkner’s politics and tried to stifle his opinions, led him to sue the college. He argued, among several claims, that the school infringed on his right to free speech, compelled him to speak against his conscience, and placed unconstitutional conditions on his earning his degree.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/win-student-speech-rhode-island
2019-04-15
Cato: On Asbestos Blame, Supreme Court is Still At Sea
With Justices Kavanaugh and Roberts crossing over to join the liberals, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 today in Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries that federal maritime law permits seafarers claiming asbestos-related ailments to sue manufacturers of ship components such as boilers and turbines that contained no asbestos, on the grounds that they knew that the mineral would be used in conjunction with their product later in such forms as insulation or connective gaskets. Justice Neil Gorsuch, dissenting on behalf of himself and Justices Thomas and Alito, had the better argument: doing so requires stretching traditional bounds of tort liability in a way that imposes unreasonable duties to warn. By requiring makers of components to pay for damages they did not cause in the name of warnings that the U.S. Navy almost certainly would not have heeded, the Court yields to an impulse to round up deep pockets lest a sympathetic set of litigants otherwise go uncompensated.
I wrote about the case in December and quoted libertarian law professor Richard Epstein, who criticized the use of legal doctrine here “to serve as surrogate (and extremely costly) social insurance: ‘the bankruptcy of parties that should be liable [i.e., primary asbestos manufacturers] is no reason to impose onerous liability on parties that should not be liable.’” At the same time I noted the argument, which plaintiffs relied on heavily and seems to have influenced today’s outcome, “that [federal] maritime law takes a particular interest in the welfare of seafarers, and a rule that permits them to win more lawsuits advances their welfare.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-all-sea-asbestos-blame
I wrote about the case in December and quoted libertarian law professor Richard Epstein, who criticized the use of legal doctrine here “to serve as surrogate (and extremely costly) social insurance: ‘the bankruptcy of parties that should be liable [i.e., primary asbestos manufacturers] is no reason to impose onerous liability on parties that should not be liable.’” At the same time I noted the argument, which plaintiffs relied on heavily and seems to have influenced today’s outcome, “that [federal] maritime law takes a particular interest in the welfare of seafarers, and a rule that permits them to win more lawsuits advances their welfare.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-all-sea-asbestos-blame
2019-04-12
Cato: Government Can’t Team Up with Your Competitors to Deny You Just Compensation
In the late 1970s, Congress passed the Wright Amendment to encourage the development of Dallas/Fort Worth Airport by restricting a nearby airport, Love Field, to servicing final destinations only in Texas and four contiguous states. Over time, pressure began mounting to “Free Love Field” and allow more interstate air travel. Love Terminal Partners (“LTP”) owned a lease of 26.8 acres of Love Field that gave it access to the runways and the ability to offer air passenger service. In 2000, LTP built a six-gate terminal on its acreage near Lemmon Avenue. Although it could not operate profitably due to the Wright Amendment, LTP invested tens of millions of dollars in this terminal on the reasonable view that that the restrictions would eventually be lifted and cause the terminal’s value to increase significantly.
But in 2006, five interested parties—Dallas (which owned Love Field), Fort Worth, Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Authority—joined with the federal government to rewrite the Wright Amendment and wipe out LTP as a viable competitor. Under their “Five Party Agreement,” the parties sought to reduce the total number of gates at Love Field, six of which would be removed from the Lemmon Avenue terminal. Dallas also agreed to acquire and demolish LTP’s terminal. This arrangement was codified in federal law through the Wright Amendment Reform Act (“WARA”), after which LTP stopped paying rent and the City of Dallas evicted the company and demolished its terminal.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/government-cant-team-competitors-deny-you-just-compensation
But in 2006, five interested parties—Dallas (which owned Love Field), Fort Worth, Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Authority—joined with the federal government to rewrite the Wright Amendment and wipe out LTP as a viable competitor. Under their “Five Party Agreement,” the parties sought to reduce the total number of gates at Love Field, six of which would be removed from the Lemmon Avenue terminal. Dallas also agreed to acquire and demolish LTP’s terminal. This arrangement was codified in federal law through the Wright Amendment Reform Act (“WARA”), after which LTP stopped paying rent and the City of Dallas evicted the company and demolished its terminal.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/government-cant-team-competitors-deny-you-just-compensation
2019-04-11
Cato: Bump Stock Ban Bumps Up Against the Constitution
After the tragic mass shooting in Las Vegas, the phrase “bump stock” entered the public lexicon. What was, and always has been, a gun-range novelty was suddenly the subject of national discussion. In the months following the tragedy, Congress considered and ultimately rejected a law banning these devices. Eager to seize political capital, however, the Trump administration sought to ban them anyway.
The administration faced one problem, though: the Constitution. As anyone who’s seen School House Rock can tell you, only Congress has the ability to write new laws. So the administration attempted to give itself such a power by “reinterpreting” an existing law: the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), which heavily regulates “machineguns.”
For decades, Congress, the executive branch, and the people shared a common understanding: the definition of “machinegun” in the NFA was clear, applying only to weapons that fired continuously from a single function. Bump stocks, which require substantial user input to fire, had never been considered “machineguns,” with precedent spanning multiple administrations. President Trump announced that his administration was changing course. The president expressly declined to go through Congress, instead directing officials to redefine bump-stock devices as “machineguns.” In turn, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) broke from decades of precedent and granted itself a new power to ban a widely owned firearm accessory.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/bump-stock-ban-bumps-against-constitution
The administration faced one problem, though: the Constitution. As anyone who’s seen School House Rock can tell you, only Congress has the ability to write new laws. So the administration attempted to give itself such a power by “reinterpreting” an existing law: the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), which heavily regulates “machineguns.”
For decades, Congress, the executive branch, and the people shared a common understanding: the definition of “machinegun” in the NFA was clear, applying only to weapons that fired continuously from a single function. Bump stocks, which require substantial user input to fire, had never been considered “machineguns,” with precedent spanning multiple administrations. President Trump announced that his administration was changing course. The president expressly declined to go through Congress, instead directing officials to redefine bump-stock devices as “machineguns.” In turn, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) broke from decades of precedent and granted itself a new power to ban a widely owned firearm accessory.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/bump-stock-ban-bumps-against-constitution
2019-04-10
Cato: Unconscious People Can’t Consent to Police Searches
A reasonable expectation of privacy is one of the most fundamental rights people hold in a free society. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches, with few exceptions. Police officers in Wisconsin violated that right when they drew Gerald Mitchell’s blood while he was unconscious—to test his blood alcohol content after a drunk-driving arrest. The state has attempted to excuse the officers by citing an implied-consent statute, which provides that simply driving on state roads constitutes consent to such searches.
The right to privacy is not absolute; police are allowed to search for evidence of a crime. But in doing so, they must follow procedures that comport with the Constitution. Before police conduct a search, Johnson v. United States (1948) indicates that the evidence should be judged by “a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” The Fourth Amendment contains a simple requirement for law enforcement that is an effective bulwark against unreasonable searches: get a warrant first.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/unconscious-people-cant-consent-police-searches
The right to privacy is not absolute; police are allowed to search for evidence of a crime. But in doing so, they must follow procedures that comport with the Constitution. Before police conduct a search, Johnson v. United States (1948) indicates that the evidence should be judged by “a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” The Fourth Amendment contains a simple requirement for law enforcement that is an effective bulwark against unreasonable searches: get a warrant first.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/unconscious-people-cant-consent-police-searches
2019-04-09
Cato: Even Something as Great as School Choice Should Not Be Federalized
Today, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Rep. Bradley Byrne (R-AL), in conjunction with U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, will unveil a bill to create a $5 billion scholarship tax credit, an unprecedented federal school choice effort. An op-ed all three have in USA Today spells out both the good of federal school choice, and inadvertently, the potential bad which makes it too dangerous to justify.
First, the good. DeVos, Cruz, and Byrne argue, quite rightly, that “education isn’t about school systems. It is about school children.” If you recognize basic reality, you’ll know that all children and families are different—different talents, values, dreams—hence it makes no sense to say all should get uniform education. But opposing school choice is de facto endorsing the idea that education should be largely uniform. One size must fit all.
They also make another crucial point, one that is starting to elicit push-back from public schooling advocates who insist that public schooling and public education are synonymous. DeVos, Cruz, and Byrne write that their proposal is not “an attack on public education.” Of course it isn’t. For one, they say their proposal would allow credit-eligible funds to be used for public school options. More broadly, just as public assistance doesn’t mean every recipient of help must go to a government grocery store, nothing about public education implies government must supply the schools. Indeed, we’ve been moving away from things like government housing projects for decades.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/thanks-no-thanks-federal-school-choice
First, the good. DeVos, Cruz, and Byrne argue, quite rightly, that “education isn’t about school systems. It is about school children.” If you recognize basic reality, you’ll know that all children and families are different—different talents, values, dreams—hence it makes no sense to say all should get uniform education. But opposing school choice is de facto endorsing the idea that education should be largely uniform. One size must fit all.
They also make another crucial point, one that is starting to elicit push-back from public schooling advocates who insist that public schooling and public education are synonymous. DeVos, Cruz, and Byrne write that their proposal is not “an attack on public education.” Of course it isn’t. For one, they say their proposal would allow credit-eligible funds to be used for public school options. More broadly, just as public assistance doesn’t mean every recipient of help must go to a government grocery store, nothing about public education implies government must supply the schools. Indeed, we’ve been moving away from things like government housing projects for decades.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/thanks-no-thanks-federal-school-choice
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