The coronavirus is battering the U.S economy as businesses cut back and close down. Unfortunately, federal policymakers are pursuing their usual misguided response to all crises—passing a big stimulus bill that will accomplish little except putting the government further into debt. After the financial crisis a decade ago, Congress passed an $800 billion stimulus and we suffered the slowest recovery since World War II.
Government spending to boost demand won’t help the economy when supply chain disruptions and safety fears are restricting production. Rather than stimulate demand, governments should repeal regulations that aren’t in place for legitimate safety reasons.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/slashing-regulations-combat-coronavirus
2020-03-26
Cato: When Is a Regulatory Taking a “Total Taking”?
Janice Smyth’s parents purchased some land in Falmouth, Massachusetts in 1975, hoping to one day build a retirement home there. Unfortunately, they died before they could commence building and the land passed to Janice. For 40 years, the land has been zoned residential and either Janice or her parents paid property taxes. Janice herself paid $70,000 to various professionals to prepare plans and applications to develop the property.
The city of Falmouth had different ideas, however. Being a coastal community, the city passed the Falmouth Wetlands Protection Bylaw in 1998, creating various “no disturbance zones” around wetlands and coastal banks. In 2008, the city strengthened its bylaw and, as a result, the only developable part of Mrs. Smyth’s land is a 115 square foot section in the northwest corner. Mrs. Smyth applied for variances and even agreed to build a house half the size of the original plan, but the city wouldn’t budge. Her property that had been worth $700,000 was assessed at $60,000, a 91.5 percent reduction in value.
Mrs. Smyth sued, alleging that the denial of the permit was a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment. Regulatory takings are different from the simplest form of a taking—that is, when the government just takes physical possession private property. Regulatory takings, by contrast, occur when various regulatory actions strip substantial value from a piece of property. They’re a little harder to define, and it doesn’t help that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on regulatory takings is muddled.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/when-regulatory-taking-total-taking
The city of Falmouth had different ideas, however. Being a coastal community, the city passed the Falmouth Wetlands Protection Bylaw in 1998, creating various “no disturbance zones” around wetlands and coastal banks. In 2008, the city strengthened its bylaw and, as a result, the only developable part of Mrs. Smyth’s land is a 115 square foot section in the northwest corner. Mrs. Smyth applied for variances and even agreed to build a house half the size of the original plan, but the city wouldn’t budge. Her property that had been worth $700,000 was assessed at $60,000, a 91.5 percent reduction in value.
Mrs. Smyth sued, alleging that the denial of the permit was a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment. Regulatory takings are different from the simplest form of a taking—that is, when the government just takes physical possession private property. Regulatory takings, by contrast, occur when various regulatory actions strip substantial value from a piece of property. They’re a little harder to define, and it doesn’t help that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on regulatory takings is muddled.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/when-regulatory-taking-total-taking
2020-03-25
Cato: “We Give Qualified Immunity to Just About Everybody”
On Wednesday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard oral argument for a special appeal in Betton v. Belue (18-1974). The case stems from a federal civil rights lawsuit brought by Julian Betton, who was shot and paralyzed when police officers raided his home on a marijuana charge. Officer David Belue was one of several South Carolinian 15th District Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) officers who participated in the raid, and this week’s argument was his appeal of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for his actions.
By now, regular readers know that Cato has been leading a campaign to abolish the qualified immunity doctrine, which unlawfully shields police officers from civil liability for violating individuals’ constitutional rights. Although the oral argument indicates that Officer Belue is going to lose his appeal, the case nevertheless shows that our civil rights laws are essential to curbing the hyperviolent police conduct that can lead to unnecessary deaths and injuries.
The facts of the case, as established by the district court, state that DEU officers used a battering ram to knock-down and enter Mr. Betton’s home without identifying themselves as officers, nor were any of the officers wearing police uniforms or other obvious indications that they were law enforcement. Mr. Betton withdrew a gun from his waistband and had it by his side when he was struck by 9 of 29 rounds fired by the intruding officers. Each of the participating officers falsely claimed that they had knocked and announced their presence before breaking into the home. At least some of the officers also falsely claimed that Mr. Betton had raised his weapon and had shot at the officers before they returned fire. For the use of force from this botched raid, Officer Belue sought qualified immunity.
In the audio file posted on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit website, the empaneled judges seemed uniformly outraged by the conduct of the officers during this raid. In particular, Judge Barbara Milano Keenan lamented, “It’s so shocking what happened in this case for a two-bit marijuana deal.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/we-give-qualified-immunity-just-about-everybody
By now, regular readers know that Cato has been leading a campaign to abolish the qualified immunity doctrine, which unlawfully shields police officers from civil liability for violating individuals’ constitutional rights. Although the oral argument indicates that Officer Belue is going to lose his appeal, the case nevertheless shows that our civil rights laws are essential to curbing the hyperviolent police conduct that can lead to unnecessary deaths and injuries.
The facts of the case, as established by the district court, state that DEU officers used a battering ram to knock-down and enter Mr. Betton’s home without identifying themselves as officers, nor were any of the officers wearing police uniforms or other obvious indications that they were law enforcement. Mr. Betton withdrew a gun from his waistband and had it by his side when he was struck by 9 of 29 rounds fired by the intruding officers. Each of the participating officers falsely claimed that they had knocked and announced their presence before breaking into the home. At least some of the officers also falsely claimed that Mr. Betton had raised his weapon and had shot at the officers before they returned fire. For the use of force from this botched raid, Officer Belue sought qualified immunity.
In the audio file posted on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit website, the empaneled judges seemed uniformly outraged by the conduct of the officers during this raid. In particular, Judge Barbara Milano Keenan lamented, “It’s so shocking what happened in this case for a two-bit marijuana deal.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/we-give-qualified-immunity-just-about-everybody
2020-03-24
Cato: How About Retroceding Washington, D.C. to Maryland?
Yesterday the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a hearing on proposals to make the District of Columbia a state, and as he has done before, Roger Pilon, founder of Cato’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, testified against the idea.
Speaking for myself, what would make more sense than D.C. statehood? Retroceding the city of Washington, or at least its residential portions, to the state of Maryland. One plan, promoted by activist David Krucoff, would turn it into Douglass County, Maryland, named after the great Frederick Douglass and conveniently retaining the initials D.C.
Maryland retrocession was long dismissed as politically impractical, perhaps because of reluctance in the Old Line State to accept the deal, but those calculations might reasonably begin to shift now that the capital city has grown exceedingly prosperous (thus making it a better fiscal bet) and has politics that no longer diverge as spectacularly from those of its neighbors to the north as in the days of former Mayor Marion Barry.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/how-about-retroceding-washington-dc-maryland
Speaking for myself, what would make more sense than D.C. statehood? Retroceding the city of Washington, or at least its residential portions, to the state of Maryland. One plan, promoted by activist David Krucoff, would turn it into Douglass County, Maryland, named after the great Frederick Douglass and conveniently retaining the initials D.C.
Maryland retrocession was long dismissed as politically impractical, perhaps because of reluctance in the Old Line State to accept the deal, but those calculations might reasonably begin to shift now that the capital city has grown exceedingly prosperous (thus making it a better fiscal bet) and has politics that no longer diverge as spectacularly from those of its neighbors to the north as in the days of former Mayor Marion Barry.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/how-about-retroceding-washington-dc-maryland
2020-03-23
Cato: Shaking Down Drug Makers Won’t Stop IV Drug Users
On August 26 Oklahoma State Judge Thad Balkman ruled that Johnson & Johnson must pay $572 million to the state of Oklahoma for contributing to the local opioid addiction crisis. Johnson & Johnson sold two opioids: a fentanyl skin patch with the brand name Duragesic, and Nucynta,a synthetic opioid similar to tramadol but stronger.
Nucynta is not as addictive as most other synthetic and semi‐synthetic opioids and has been shown to have low levels of abuse in post‐marketing studies. Fentanyl skin patches are very difficult and inconvenient to convert for non‐medical use. The Drug Enforcement Administration claims that nearly all the fentanyl seized is so‐called “illicit fentanyl,” manufactured mostly in powdered form in clandestine labs in Asia and Mexico, and then smuggled in to the U.S., sometimes via the Postal Service.
Johnson & Johnson was also charged with contributing to the overdose crisis because it owns two subsidiaries that make the active ingredients and narcotic raw materials used by other opioid manufacturers.
Two other opioid manufacturers, Purdue Pharma and Teva Pharmaceuticals, settled with the state, but Johnson & Johnson decided to take the case to trial. Their attorneys say the company plans to appeal the decision.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/shakedown-drug-makers-will-make-one-iv-drug-user-pull-needle-out-their-arm
Nucynta is not as addictive as most other synthetic and semi‐synthetic opioids and has been shown to have low levels of abuse in post‐marketing studies. Fentanyl skin patches are very difficult and inconvenient to convert for non‐medical use. The Drug Enforcement Administration claims that nearly all the fentanyl seized is so‐called “illicit fentanyl,” manufactured mostly in powdered form in clandestine labs in Asia and Mexico, and then smuggled in to the U.S., sometimes via the Postal Service.
Johnson & Johnson was also charged with contributing to the overdose crisis because it owns two subsidiaries that make the active ingredients and narcotic raw materials used by other opioid manufacturers.
Two other opioid manufacturers, Purdue Pharma and Teva Pharmaceuticals, settled with the state, but Johnson & Johnson decided to take the case to trial. Their attorneys say the company plans to appeal the decision.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/shakedown-drug-makers-will-make-one-iv-drug-user-pull-needle-out-their-arm
2020-03-22
Cato: Don’t Abuse Property Rights to Build Pipelines
The demand for American energy independence and expansion of the natural gas industry have led to a marked increase in the construction of new gas pipelines. The Natural Gas Act empowers the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to delegate to private pipeline companies the power to take private property to build these pipelines, so long as they pay the just compensation due under the Fifth Amendment. Not content with the power to begin construction after judicially authorized transfer of title, however, these companies have claimed the equivalent of government power—not mere delegated authority—by taking property before any adjudication by means of preliminary injunctions, with even fewer owner protections than statutory “quick takes” (expedited title transfers).
Karolyn and Clarence Givens had farmed their land for a decade before a pipeline company undertook to construct a 303‐mile pipeline from West Virginia to Virginia, including a segment that would cross their property. Since Clarence’s death in 2017, Karolyn has depended on rents from the farm to maintain her income. That income has been jeopardized by an early taking, forcing Karolyn to move her cattle onto a parcel occupied by a current tenant. Like other landowners in the area, Mrs. Givens has expressed concerns over the potential environmental and safety risks posed by the new pipeline. These concerns too have been vindicated as the company’s efforts have left her farm scarred by potholes, erosion, and twisted fencing.
Courts in three federal districts have granted preliminary injunctions allowing for the possession of Givens’s land before a final determination of just compensation, subject to a bond. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld these injunctions on appeal.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/dont-abuse-property-rights-build-pipelines
Karolyn and Clarence Givens had farmed their land for a decade before a pipeline company undertook to construct a 303‐mile pipeline from West Virginia to Virginia, including a segment that would cross their property. Since Clarence’s death in 2017, Karolyn has depended on rents from the farm to maintain her income. That income has been jeopardized by an early taking, forcing Karolyn to move her cattle onto a parcel occupied by a current tenant. Like other landowners in the area, Mrs. Givens has expressed concerns over the potential environmental and safety risks posed by the new pipeline. These concerns too have been vindicated as the company’s efforts have left her farm scarred by potholes, erosion, and twisted fencing.
Courts in three federal districts have granted preliminary injunctions allowing for the possession of Givens’s land before a final determination of just compensation, subject to a bond. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld these injunctions on appeal.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/dont-abuse-property-rights-build-pipelines
2020-03-21
Cato: States Lead The Way in Coronavirus Crisis With Emergency Removal of Occupational Licensing Obstacles—Why Not Make Them Permanent?
Today, Vice President Mike Pence announced that the Department of Health and Human Services is considering a national emergency order that would allow doctors throughout the country to practice across state lines. This would be a good move, and luckily, many states are already ahead of the federal government on implementing such measures.
For example, Massachusetts Governor Baker ordered the state’s Board of Registration in Nursing to implement an emergency procedure last week that would grant temporary licenses, within one day, to nurses holding out‐of‐state licenses who wish to come to Massachusetts and staff health care facilities. This move was undertaken out of concern that the COVID-19 outbreak may leave health care facilities overwhelmed with patients and understaffed by health care professionals.
For the same reason, earlier this week, the Governors of South Carolina, Texas, and Maryland ordered their state’s Boards of Medicine and Nursing to issue temporary licenses to doctors and nurses holding out‐of‐state licenses. These are good moves, and hopefully more governors will follow the example.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/states-lead-way-coronavirus-crisis-emergency-removal-occupational-licensing-obstacles-why-not
For example, Massachusetts Governor Baker ordered the state’s Board of Registration in Nursing to implement an emergency procedure last week that would grant temporary licenses, within one day, to nurses holding out‐of‐state licenses who wish to come to Massachusetts and staff health care facilities. This move was undertaken out of concern that the COVID-19 outbreak may leave health care facilities overwhelmed with patients and understaffed by health care professionals.
For the same reason, earlier this week, the Governors of South Carolina, Texas, and Maryland ordered their state’s Boards of Medicine and Nursing to issue temporary licenses to doctors and nurses holding out‐of‐state licenses. These are good moves, and hopefully more governors will follow the example.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/states-lead-way-coronavirus-crisis-emergency-removal-occupational-licensing-obstacles-why-not
Cato: Kamala’s Conundrum
During Wednesday night’s Democratic presidential debate, Tulsi Gabbard tore into Kamala Harris for her track record as a prosecutor in San Francisco and later as California’s Attorney General. The attack was sharp and effective, earning Gabbard an outsize share of the post-debate commentary. Its thrust was entirely fair, too, as any number of articles have demonstrated, including Lara Bazelon’s recent takedown in The New York Times titled Kamala Haris Was Not a Progressive Prosecutor.
The real significance of Gabbard’s critique, however, lies not in the proposition that Harris was a particularly unprofessional or malign prosecutor, but rather in the fact that she seems to have been a rather ordinary prosecutor who simply did her job the way most prosecutors do. And if that makes a former-prosecutor-turned-presidential-candidate look like a monster, then perhaps that says more about prosecutors in general than it does about Kamala Harris in particular.
Gabbard’s gut-punch underscores the difficult position that modern prosecutors find themselves in as the key players in a substantially immoral and increasingly indefensible criminal justice system. A near-universal blind spot of career prosecutors like Harris is their failure to appreciate the fact that law and morality can—and in our system frequently do—diverge.
Is it hypocritical for a person who has used marijuana to prosecute someone for possessing or selling it? Plainly yes, as Gabbard suggested in calling out Harris for doing precisely that. But enforcing bogus laws is not just hypocritical, it can be immoral as well. Consider the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, a federal law that, among other things, required citizens of free states to assist in the capture and return of escaped slaves. Or eugenics laws adopted by more than half the states during the 20th century that subjected tens of thousands of law-abiding citizens, mostly young women, to forced sterilization and a childless future. Then there’s Shreveport, Louisiana’s ordinance making it a crime to wear saggy pants. Some 726 men, 96 percent of them black, were arrested under that law between its adoption in 2007 and its repeal in June of this year, after a Shreveport officer shot and killed 31-year-old Anthony Childs while trying to arrest him for wearing pants that didn’t come up to his waist. All of those laws were immoral, and participating in their enforcement constitutes a manifestly immoral act.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/kamalas-conundrum
The real significance of Gabbard’s critique, however, lies not in the proposition that Harris was a particularly unprofessional or malign prosecutor, but rather in the fact that she seems to have been a rather ordinary prosecutor who simply did her job the way most prosecutors do. And if that makes a former-prosecutor-turned-presidential-candidate look like a monster, then perhaps that says more about prosecutors in general than it does about Kamala Harris in particular.
Gabbard’s gut-punch underscores the difficult position that modern prosecutors find themselves in as the key players in a substantially immoral and increasingly indefensible criminal justice system. A near-universal blind spot of career prosecutors like Harris is their failure to appreciate the fact that law and morality can—and in our system frequently do—diverge.
Is it hypocritical for a person who has used marijuana to prosecute someone for possessing or selling it? Plainly yes, as Gabbard suggested in calling out Harris for doing precisely that. But enforcing bogus laws is not just hypocritical, it can be immoral as well. Consider the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, a federal law that, among other things, required citizens of free states to assist in the capture and return of escaped slaves. Or eugenics laws adopted by more than half the states during the 20th century that subjected tens of thousands of law-abiding citizens, mostly young women, to forced sterilization and a childless future. Then there’s Shreveport, Louisiana’s ordinance making it a crime to wear saggy pants. Some 726 men, 96 percent of them black, were arrested under that law between its adoption in 2007 and its repeal in June of this year, after a Shreveport officer shot and killed 31-year-old Anthony Childs while trying to arrest him for wearing pants that didn’t come up to his waist. All of those laws were immoral, and participating in their enforcement constitutes a manifestly immoral act.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/kamalas-conundrum
2020-03-20
Cato: A Detached, Inflexible, Regulatory System Caused A Flat‐Footed Response to Coronavirus Outbreak, Disregarded Our “Right to Test”
This morning, NBC Think published my opinion column discussing the sclerotic and disorganized initial response of the federal public health system to a building coronavirus pandemic.
In my column, I point out how the Food and Drug Administration’s cumbersome regulatory process resulted in a single, government‐monopoly coronavirus test, made available in limited supply, by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
This process kept the private sector and foreign‐developed tests out of the process during the crucial weeks between when the first virus was identified in December and when it started spreading throughout the U.S. Meanwhile, when the tests were initially rolled out, they were found to be defective, forcing the CDC to play catch up getting new, corrected tests out to the public.
All of this was happening while other countries were already relying on tests developed by numerous private sector companies and organizations, operating under more liberal regulatory regimes.
The World Health Organization distributed a test developed by a Berlin biotech firm to 57 countries and China had five commercial tests on the market in January. South Korea enacted a reform after suffering a devastating attack of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015 that grants nearly immediate approval of testing systems in the event of an emergency.
While the rest of the world sought to benefit from and enable private sector initiatives, the U.S. embraced a top‐down command‐and‐control approach to the present biomedical challenge, replete with red tape and poor communication with local public health officials. This is not only tragic and unacceptable. It’s embarrassing.
Only in recent days has the FDA relaxed its stringent approval process and encouraged a rapid private sector response.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/detached-inflexible-regulatory-system-caused-flat-footed-response-coronavirus-outbreak
In my column, I point out how the Food and Drug Administration’s cumbersome regulatory process resulted in a single, government‐monopoly coronavirus test, made available in limited supply, by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
This process kept the private sector and foreign‐developed tests out of the process during the crucial weeks between when the first virus was identified in December and when it started spreading throughout the U.S. Meanwhile, when the tests were initially rolled out, they were found to be defective, forcing the CDC to play catch up getting new, corrected tests out to the public.
All of this was happening while other countries were already relying on tests developed by numerous private sector companies and organizations, operating under more liberal regulatory regimes.
The World Health Organization distributed a test developed by a Berlin biotech firm to 57 countries and China had five commercial tests on the market in January. South Korea enacted a reform after suffering a devastating attack of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015 that grants nearly immediate approval of testing systems in the event of an emergency.
While the rest of the world sought to benefit from and enable private sector initiatives, the U.S. embraced a top‐down command‐and‐control approach to the present biomedical challenge, replete with red tape and poor communication with local public health officials. This is not only tragic and unacceptable. It’s embarrassing.
Only in recent days has the FDA relaxed its stringent approval process and encouraged a rapid private sector response.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/detached-inflexible-regulatory-system-caused-flat-footed-response-coronavirus-outbreak
Cato: Why Would the Government Fight a $900 Judgment? To Make it Easier to Take People’s Land
Sometimes the most important court cases are the most obscure and hard to understand. Caquelin v. United States comes out of the government vigorously opposing a judgment that it owes Norma Caquelin $900 for the 180 days that she couldn’t use a relatively small part of her Iowa farmland. But the case is part of a larger and ongoing fight over the status of abandoned railroad tracks that affects thousands of property owners.
Railroad lines once extended throughout the United States. At the peak in 1916, more than 270,000 miles of track crisscrossed the country. As railroads became less popular, however, thousands of miles of rail lines were left unused. Since the 1980s, the Rails‐to‐Trails Act has converted former rail lines into hiking and biking trails. But many of those rail lines were originally easements across private property. Under common‐law doctrine, when an easement is abandoned and no longer used for the original purpose, the land “reverts” back to the property over which the easement was granted. Therefore, if the government wants to use part of an abandoned rail line for a trail, it needs to pay for the land under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Norma Caquelin’s great grandfather purchased a prime piece of Iowa farmland in 1892. Railroad tracks were placed on the land in 1870 and were part of the property when he purchased it. The farm was still in the family when the railroad company sought permission from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the tracks. Under the Rails‐to‐Trails Act, after a railroad seeks permission to abandon tracks, potential trail developers can file a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) to develop the tracks into a trail. After the railroad sought to abandon the tracks on Caquelin’s land, the city of Ackley and the Iowa National Heritage Foundation filed an NITU, which began a 180‐day period of negotiations with the railroad to acquire the land. In the end, no deal was reached.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/why-would-government-fight-900-judgment-make-it-easier-take-peoples-land
Railroad lines once extended throughout the United States. At the peak in 1916, more than 270,000 miles of track crisscrossed the country. As railroads became less popular, however, thousands of miles of rail lines were left unused. Since the 1980s, the Rails‐to‐Trails Act has converted former rail lines into hiking and biking trails. But many of those rail lines were originally easements across private property. Under common‐law doctrine, when an easement is abandoned and no longer used for the original purpose, the land “reverts” back to the property over which the easement was granted. Therefore, if the government wants to use part of an abandoned rail line for a trail, it needs to pay for the land under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Norma Caquelin’s great grandfather purchased a prime piece of Iowa farmland in 1892. Railroad tracks were placed on the land in 1870 and were part of the property when he purchased it. The farm was still in the family when the railroad company sought permission from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the tracks. Under the Rails‐to‐Trails Act, after a railroad seeks permission to abandon tracks, potential trail developers can file a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) to develop the tracks into a trail. After the railroad sought to abandon the tracks on Caquelin’s land, the city of Ackley and the Iowa National Heritage Foundation filed an NITU, which began a 180‐day period of negotiations with the railroad to acquire the land. In the end, no deal was reached.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/why-would-government-fight-900-judgment-make-it-easier-take-peoples-land
2020-03-19
Cato: Sunlight Exposes Dangers: Free Speech In (and After) a Pandemic
Plenty of misinformation is circulating about the COVID-19 pandemic, and that can lead to impatience about or even hostility toward free speech. Would we be better off if the government stepped in to restrict or penalize false reports? Such restrictions would not be unknown in time of epidemic. The city of Newark, N.J. recently threatened to prosecute persons who make false statements about the outbreak.
In a fine new piece, Greg Lukianoff of FIRE (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) points out that free speech helps bolster resilience to threats like the virus, in multiple ways.
To begin with, the looming crisis with COVID-19 is far worse than otherwise because of the repressive state policies of the Chinese Communist Party (today, China announced that it is expelling reporters from the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, and will not even let them work in Hong Kong.) Specifically:
Despite the inapt metaphor often applied, Lukianoff argues, an arena of free expression does not really function as a “marketplace of ideas” in which competition works to drive out peddlers of falsehood the way a market for goods tends to drive out peddlers of lamps that don’t light. In the idea business, there are people, institutions, and movements that prosper for the longest time selling total junk. Hence the observed failure of the hope for “the good ideas to ever finally defeat and drive from the earth bad ideas.” The difference is that in systems controlled by the government, like China, those who operate the control switch can cut you off from those trying to reach you with the truth. “Freedom of speech gives you a fighting chance to know the world as it really is.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/sunlight-exposes-dangers-free-speech-after-pandemic
In a fine new piece, Greg Lukianoff of FIRE (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) points out that free speech helps bolster resilience to threats like the virus, in multiple ways.
To begin with, the looming crisis with COVID-19 is far worse than otherwise because of the repressive state policies of the Chinese Communist Party (today, China announced that it is expelling reporters from the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, and will not even let them work in Hong Kong.) Specifically:
"Since at least Jan. 1, China enforced severe social media censorship of hundreds of terms relating to the virus, many of which concerned the failures of China’s leadership in controlling the outbreak. Because people in China didn’t have access to information about the virus, they didn’t know to take extra precautions, allowing it to spread faster, all the while preventing the world from preparing its response during the crucial first weeks of the outbreak.
In closed societies like China, government officials have the power to stop the free flow of information if they believe it poses a threat of any kind, either real or imagined; and in authoritarian regimes, like China, the leaders of countries often see anything that might embarrass the country in the eyes of the world as a threat. By contrast, if the initial outbreak had happened in the United States, where the government has comparatively little legitimate power to control what citizens say, it’s doubtful that the disease would’ve gone unnoticed."
Despite the inapt metaphor often applied, Lukianoff argues, an arena of free expression does not really function as a “marketplace of ideas” in which competition works to drive out peddlers of falsehood the way a market for goods tends to drive out peddlers of lamps that don’t light. In the idea business, there are people, institutions, and movements that prosper for the longest time selling total junk. Hence the observed failure of the hope for “the good ideas to ever finally defeat and drive from the earth bad ideas.” The difference is that in systems controlled by the government, like China, those who operate the control switch can cut you off from those trying to reach you with the truth. “Freedom of speech gives you a fighting chance to know the world as it really is.”
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/sunlight-exposes-dangers-free-speech-after-pandemic
Cato: Eleventh Circuit Grants Immunity to Officer Who Shot Child Lying on the Ground
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Corbitt v. Vickers, handed down last week, constitutes one of the most grotesque and indefensible applications of the qualified immunity I’ve ever seen. The case involves a claim of excessive force against Michael Vickers, a deputy sheriff in Coffee County, Georgia, who shot a ten-year-old child lying on the ground, while repeatedly attempting to shoot a pet dog that wasn’t posing any threat. Without even deciding the constitutional question, a majority of the Eleventh Circuit panel granted qualified immunity to Vickers, simply because there was no case on point with this particular set of facts.
The key facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows: Vickers and other officers were pursuing a criminal suspect, Christopher Barnett, when Barnett wandered into the backyard of Amy Corbitt (who had no relation to Barnett). At the time, one adult and six minor children were in the yard, and the officers demanded they all get on the ground. Everyone immediately complied, and the police took Barnett into custody.
But then, the family’s pet dog Bruce walked into the scene. Without provocation or any immediate threat, Vickers fired his weapon at Bruce. His first shot missed, and Bruce retreated under the home. About ten seconds later, Bruce reappeared and approached his owners, and Vickers fired again – missing once more, but this time striking Corbitt’s ten-year-old child, who was at the time still lying on the ground only 18 inches away. The bullet tore through the back of the child’s knee, causing serious injuries. The child suffered severe pain and mental trauma and has to receive ongoing care from an orthopedic surgeon.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/eleventh-circuit-grants-immunity-officer-who-shot-child-lying-ground-while-trying-shoot
The key facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows: Vickers and other officers were pursuing a criminal suspect, Christopher Barnett, when Barnett wandered into the backyard of Amy Corbitt (who had no relation to Barnett). At the time, one adult and six minor children were in the yard, and the officers demanded they all get on the ground. Everyone immediately complied, and the police took Barnett into custody.
But then, the family’s pet dog Bruce walked into the scene. Without provocation or any immediate threat, Vickers fired his weapon at Bruce. His first shot missed, and Bruce retreated under the home. About ten seconds later, Bruce reappeared and approached his owners, and Vickers fired again – missing once more, but this time striking Corbitt’s ten-year-old child, who was at the time still lying on the ground only 18 inches away. The bullet tore through the back of the child’s knee, causing serious injuries. The child suffered severe pain and mental trauma and has to receive ongoing care from an orthopedic surgeon.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/eleventh-circuit-grants-immunity-officer-who-shot-child-lying-ground-while-trying-shoot
2020-03-18
Cato: Certificate of Need Laws Will Impede Preparedness For The Expected Surge in COVID-19 Cases
The number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection in the U.S. continues to increase. All indications are that we are now just seeing the tip of the iceberg. Hospitals across the country are gearing up for an anticipated deluge of sick patients in their emergency departments, and hospital admissions that will stress—and possibly overwhelm—their intensive care units and general bed capacity. In response to the outbreak in China, a 1,000-bed isolation hospital was constructed in just 10 days—a feat that would be difficult to replicate in this country with its web of federal, state, and local regulations.
In today’s Washington Examiner, Lindsey Killen of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy and Naomi Lopez of the Goldwater Institute draw attention to the archaic Certificate of Need Laws (CON laws) that continue to exist in 38 states. These state laws, promoted by the National Health Planning and Resource Act of 1974, were intended to reduce health care costs by eliminating redundancy in health care delivery systems. They vary from state to state, but essentially require a panel to review any plans by hospitals or other health care organizations to expand, build new hospitals, or in some cases, add equipment. The review panels include incumbent health care organizations. Imagine a CON law for restaurants that empanels existing restaurant owners to review applications by persons wishing to build a new restaurant or expand the capacity or offerings of an existing one. It doesn’t take long to understand how that turns into an incumbent protection law. By the early 1980s it became clear, as in all cases of central planning, that CON laws were doing nothing to reduce health care costs and may have had the opposite effect. The federal law was repealed during the Reagan Administration.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/certificate-need-laws-will-impede-preparedness-expected-surge-covid-19-cases
In today’s Washington Examiner, Lindsey Killen of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy and Naomi Lopez of the Goldwater Institute draw attention to the archaic Certificate of Need Laws (CON laws) that continue to exist in 38 states. These state laws, promoted by the National Health Planning and Resource Act of 1974, were intended to reduce health care costs by eliminating redundancy in health care delivery systems. They vary from state to state, but essentially require a panel to review any plans by hospitals or other health care organizations to expand, build new hospitals, or in some cases, add equipment. The review panels include incumbent health care organizations. Imagine a CON law for restaurants that empanels existing restaurant owners to review applications by persons wishing to build a new restaurant or expand the capacity or offerings of an existing one. It doesn’t take long to understand how that turns into an incumbent protection law. By the early 1980s it became clear, as in all cases of central planning, that CON laws were doing nothing to reduce health care costs and may have had the opposite effect. The federal law was repealed during the Reagan Administration.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/certificate-need-laws-will-impede-preparedness-expected-surge-covid-19-cases
2019-06-17
Cato: Shamefully, Only Two Justices Find that You Can’t Be Prosecuted by a State and the Feds for the Same Crime
This morning, in the case of Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2—with only Justices Neil Gorsuch and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in dissent—that state and federal governments can continue having a second bite at the apple, both prosecuting someone for the same crime if they wish. It’s really unfortunate that the justices declined to withdraw the “dual-sovereignty” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court itself created this doctrine decades ago, before the federal criminal code (unconstitutionally) exploded and before the Double Jeopardy Clause even applied to the states.
As Justice Gorsuch wrote, “the separate-sovereigns exception to the bar against double jeopardy finds no meaningful support in the text of the Constitution, it’s original public meaning, structure, or history.” To put a finer point on it, it’s fully consistent with federalism to say that nobody should be prosecuted twice for the same crime.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/shamefully-only-two-justices-find-you-cant-be-prosecuted-state-feds-same-crime
As Justice Gorsuch wrote, “the separate-sovereigns exception to the bar against double jeopardy finds no meaningful support in the text of the Constitution, it’s original public meaning, structure, or history.” To put a finer point on it, it’s fully consistent with federalism to say that nobody should be prosecuted twice for the same crime.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/shamefully-only-two-justices-find-you-cant-be-prosecuted-state-feds-same-crime
2019-04-30
Cato: The Mueller Report: FAQs
1. Did Trump collude with Russians who tried to influence the 2016 presidential election?
No. In Volume 1 of his report, Mueller didn’t mention “collusion,” which is not a legal term. He did, however, find that there was no evidence of a conspiracy, and he therefore exonerated Trump on that count. Still, Mueller concluded that the Russians did interfere, Trump was aware of the interference, he benefited from and encouraged the interference – e.g., Don, Jr. was eager to get and use information on Hillary Clinton – and he didn’t report the interference to the FBI. So, there was no crime and maybe no impeachable offense, but Mueller’s findings will likely inform voters regarding Trump’s fitness for office.
2. Did Trump obstruct justice by impeding either Comey’s or Mueller’s investigations?
Maybe. In Volume 2, Mueller cited numerous acts that could have frustrated both investigations. Trump fired Comey, tried to fire Mueller – but didn’t succeed because White House counsel Don McGahn refused to follow instructions – discouraged testimony, encouraged lying, and dangled (but didn’t actually offer) pardons. Given the evidence, Mueller concluded that he could not exonerate Trump from an obstruction charge. Nonetheless, Mueller would not say whether there was an indictable crime because of a written Justice Department policy that a sitting president cannot be indicted. It would be unfair to charge the president without affording him an opportunity to defend himself at trial. In other words, there may or may not have been sufficient evidence of a crime or impeachable offense; but there was clearly too much evidence to exonerate. Mueller left the criminal charge up to Attorney General Barr; and he left impeachment up to Congress.
3. Since the FBI director serves at the pleasure of the president, could Trump fire Comey at will?
Yes. There are no statutory conditions on the president’s authority to remove the FBI director. He or she serves at the will of the president. But if the president acts with “corrupt intent” – e.g., to impede an investigation into his own conduct – then he can be charged with obstruction of justice. In this instance, by Trump’s own words, he fired Comey because of “this Russian thing.”
4. But can there be corrupt intent if “this Russian thing” was not a crime?
Yes. It’s not necessary to prove an underlying crime in order to charge someone with obstructing justice. Admittedly, however, it’s more difficult to show corrupt intent if there’s no underlying crime. After all, how could Trump have obstructed justice related to the conspiracy investigation if there was no conspiracy? The short answer is that Trump’s motive might have been corrupt even if unrelated to proving his innocence. For example, he may have wanted to protect personal (e.g., family) interests, or business interests, or his political standing with voters. Or he may have wanted to frustrate an investigation into someone else’s crime; or to avoid exposure to a gray area of the law, or to non-criminal impeachment.
5. Trump cooperated with the investigation. How then could he have obstructed justice?
On one hand, Trump provided roughly one million documents; he did not invoke executive privilege; and he allowed White House counsel Don McGahn to testify. But, on the other hand, he refused to testify in person, and he provided inadequate answers to Mueller’s written questions. If time were not of the essence, Mueller would likely have used his subpoena power. Limited cooperation isn’t sufficient to preclude an obstruction charge.
6. Mueller’s report, as released, was redacted by Attorney General Barr. Were the redactions proper?
Yes. Barr followed the law, which requires that he redact grand jury testimony, classified material, items related to ongoing investigations, and details that could compromise the privacy of innocent persons. Barr committed to as much transparency as lawful, and it appears that he honored that commitment. Only a few of the redactions were grand jury related; most of the redactions involved ongoing investigations.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/mueller-report-faqs
No. In Volume 1 of his report, Mueller didn’t mention “collusion,” which is not a legal term. He did, however, find that there was no evidence of a conspiracy, and he therefore exonerated Trump on that count. Still, Mueller concluded that the Russians did interfere, Trump was aware of the interference, he benefited from and encouraged the interference – e.g., Don, Jr. was eager to get and use information on Hillary Clinton – and he didn’t report the interference to the FBI. So, there was no crime and maybe no impeachable offense, but Mueller’s findings will likely inform voters regarding Trump’s fitness for office.
2. Did Trump obstruct justice by impeding either Comey’s or Mueller’s investigations?
Maybe. In Volume 2, Mueller cited numerous acts that could have frustrated both investigations. Trump fired Comey, tried to fire Mueller – but didn’t succeed because White House counsel Don McGahn refused to follow instructions – discouraged testimony, encouraged lying, and dangled (but didn’t actually offer) pardons. Given the evidence, Mueller concluded that he could not exonerate Trump from an obstruction charge. Nonetheless, Mueller would not say whether there was an indictable crime because of a written Justice Department policy that a sitting president cannot be indicted. It would be unfair to charge the president without affording him an opportunity to defend himself at trial. In other words, there may or may not have been sufficient evidence of a crime or impeachable offense; but there was clearly too much evidence to exonerate. Mueller left the criminal charge up to Attorney General Barr; and he left impeachment up to Congress.
3. Since the FBI director serves at the pleasure of the president, could Trump fire Comey at will?
Yes. There are no statutory conditions on the president’s authority to remove the FBI director. He or she serves at the will of the president. But if the president acts with “corrupt intent” – e.g., to impede an investigation into his own conduct – then he can be charged with obstruction of justice. In this instance, by Trump’s own words, he fired Comey because of “this Russian thing.”
4. But can there be corrupt intent if “this Russian thing” was not a crime?
Yes. It’s not necessary to prove an underlying crime in order to charge someone with obstructing justice. Admittedly, however, it’s more difficult to show corrupt intent if there’s no underlying crime. After all, how could Trump have obstructed justice related to the conspiracy investigation if there was no conspiracy? The short answer is that Trump’s motive might have been corrupt even if unrelated to proving his innocence. For example, he may have wanted to protect personal (e.g., family) interests, or business interests, or his political standing with voters. Or he may have wanted to frustrate an investigation into someone else’s crime; or to avoid exposure to a gray area of the law, or to non-criminal impeachment.
5. Trump cooperated with the investigation. How then could he have obstructed justice?
On one hand, Trump provided roughly one million documents; he did not invoke executive privilege; and he allowed White House counsel Don McGahn to testify. But, on the other hand, he refused to testify in person, and he provided inadequate answers to Mueller’s written questions. If time were not of the essence, Mueller would likely have used his subpoena power. Limited cooperation isn’t sufficient to preclude an obstruction charge.
6. Mueller’s report, as released, was redacted by Attorney General Barr. Were the redactions proper?
Yes. Barr followed the law, which requires that he redact grand jury testimony, classified material, items related to ongoing investigations, and details that could compromise the privacy of innocent persons. Barr committed to as much transparency as lawful, and it appears that he honored that commitment. Only a few of the redactions were grand jury related; most of the redactions involved ongoing investigations.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/mueller-report-faqs
2019-04-29
Cato: Criminal Obstruction vs. Impeachable Obstruction
Earlier this month, the effort to impeach President Trump looked like a #Resistance fantasy. The release of the Mueller Report seems to have shifted the debate dramatically. This week, Democratic presidential contenders Sen. Kamala Harris and Sen. Elizabeth Warren called on the House to impeach Trump for obstruction of justice.
Is obstruction of justice an impeachable offense? Yes. It’s one of the few offenses where we have presidential precedent. Obstruction charges played a central role in two of the three serious presidential impeachment cases in American history, forming the basis for Article I of the charges against Richard Nixon, and Article II against Bill Clinton.
Should President Trump be impeached for obstruction of justice? I’m not going to answer that question here; like the cagey Mayor Pete, I’m “going to leave it to the House and Senate to figure that out.” Instead, I want to stress something that should be obvious, but tends to get lost amid the statutory exegesis in Mueller Vol. II: whether the president is guilty of criminal obstruction and whether he’s guilty of impeachable obstruction are different questions.
Summing up Article I of the case against Nixon, the 1974 House Judiciary Committee report explained that:
"President Nixon’s actions…. were contrary to his trust as President and unmindful of the solemn duties of his high office. It was this serious violation of Richard M. Nixon’s constitutional obligations as president, and not the fact that violations of Federal criminal statutes occurred, that lies at the heart of Article I [emphasis added]."
The Judiciary Committee report on the Clinton impeachment echoed that analysis a quarter-century later: “the actions of President Clinton do not have to rise to the level of violating the federal statute regarding obstruction of justice in order to justify impeachment.”
The standards are different because impeachment and the criminal law serve distinct ends and have very different consequences. “The purpose of impeachment is not personal punishment,” the Judiciary Committee emphasized in its 1974 staff report on “Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment”; instead, impeachment’s function “is primarily to maintain constitutional government.” And where the criminal law deprives the convicted party of liberty, a successful impeachment mainly puts him out of a job.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/criminal-obstruction-vs-impeachable-obstruction
Is obstruction of justice an impeachable offense? Yes. It’s one of the few offenses where we have presidential precedent. Obstruction charges played a central role in two of the three serious presidential impeachment cases in American history, forming the basis for Article I of the charges against Richard Nixon, and Article II against Bill Clinton.
Should President Trump be impeached for obstruction of justice? I’m not going to answer that question here; like the cagey Mayor Pete, I’m “going to leave it to the House and Senate to figure that out.” Instead, I want to stress something that should be obvious, but tends to get lost amid the statutory exegesis in Mueller Vol. II: whether the president is guilty of criminal obstruction and whether he’s guilty of impeachable obstruction are different questions.
Summing up Article I of the case against Nixon, the 1974 House Judiciary Committee report explained that:
"President Nixon’s actions…. were contrary to his trust as President and unmindful of the solemn duties of his high office. It was this serious violation of Richard M. Nixon’s constitutional obligations as president, and not the fact that violations of Federal criminal statutes occurred, that lies at the heart of Article I [emphasis added]."
The Judiciary Committee report on the Clinton impeachment echoed that analysis a quarter-century later: “the actions of President Clinton do not have to rise to the level of violating the federal statute regarding obstruction of justice in order to justify impeachment.”
The standards are different because impeachment and the criminal law serve distinct ends and have very different consequences. “The purpose of impeachment is not personal punishment,” the Judiciary Committee emphasized in its 1974 staff report on “Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment”; instead, impeachment’s function “is primarily to maintain constitutional government.” And where the criminal law deprives the convicted party of liberty, a successful impeachment mainly puts him out of a job.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/criminal-obstruction-vs-impeachable-obstruction
2019-04-19
Cato: Wisconsin’s Butter Grading Law Is Udderly Ridiculous
Minerva Dairy, based in Ohio, is America’s oldest family-owned cheese and butter dairy. It has been producing artisanal, slow-churned butter in small batches since 1935. It has sustained its business through their website and by selling to regional distributers in several states. This model has worked well everywhere except Wisconsin, which requires butter manufacturers to jump through a series of cumbersome and expensive hoops to sell their product.
Of course, Wisconsin is America’s Dairyland, with many large producers who (big surprise) have an interest in limiting competition. At the behest of these companies, the state requires every batch of butter to be “graded” by a specifically state-licensed grader—all of whom live in Wisconsin, except for a half-dozen in neighboring Illinois and a handful around the country that have been licensed only in the last year—who must taste-test every single batch. Because Minerva’s butter is produced in multiple small batches over the course of each day, the law would effectively require the dairy to keep a licensed tester on-site at all times, which is cost-prohibitive. The state admits that the grading scheme has nothing to do with public health or nutrition, but claims that its grades, based largely on taste, inform consumers.
The fact that Wisconsin is trying to shape the taste of butter isn’t even the most absurd part of this story. The criteria used to grade the butter are a ludicrous mad-lib of meaningless jargon not even the state’s experts understand. The law purports to identify such flavor characteristics as “flat,” “ragged-boring,” and “utensil.” (All commonplace terms spoken by consumers in dairy aisles across the nation, no doubt.) The terminology hearkens to a freshmanic—not even sophomoric—term paper on the semiotics of postmodern agrarian literature. To claim that a grade calculated with reference to udder nonsense serves the purpose of informing anyone illustrates the danger inherent in judges’ deferring to government rationales for silly laws that burden people who are just trying to make an honest living.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wisconsins-butter-grading-law-udderly-ridiculous
Of course, Wisconsin is America’s Dairyland, with many large producers who (big surprise) have an interest in limiting competition. At the behest of these companies, the state requires every batch of butter to be “graded” by a specifically state-licensed grader—all of whom live in Wisconsin, except for a half-dozen in neighboring Illinois and a handful around the country that have been licensed only in the last year—who must taste-test every single batch. Because Minerva’s butter is produced in multiple small batches over the course of each day, the law would effectively require the dairy to keep a licensed tester on-site at all times, which is cost-prohibitive. The state admits that the grading scheme has nothing to do with public health or nutrition, but claims that its grades, based largely on taste, inform consumers.
The fact that Wisconsin is trying to shape the taste of butter isn’t even the most absurd part of this story. The criteria used to grade the butter are a ludicrous mad-lib of meaningless jargon not even the state’s experts understand. The law purports to identify such flavor characteristics as “flat,” “ragged-boring,” and “utensil.” (All commonplace terms spoken by consumers in dairy aisles across the nation, no doubt.) The terminology hearkens to a freshmanic—not even sophomoric—term paper on the semiotics of postmodern agrarian literature. To claim that a grade calculated with reference to udder nonsense serves the purpose of informing anyone illustrates the danger inherent in judges’ deferring to government rationales for silly laws that burden people who are just trying to make an honest living.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/wisconsins-butter-grading-law-udderly-ridiculous
2019-04-18
Cato: Cato’s Latest “Funny” Brief
“Fuct” is a clothing brand with, shall we say, a colorful name. It doesn’t take much imagination to figure out what they’re going for, and of course those who brazenly wear the clothing are fully aware of the signal it sends. Nevertheless, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decided that the American public’s fragile sensibilities should be protected from this brand, at least in some way, by denying federal trademark registration on the grounds that the brand name is “scandalous.” The PTO also has fainting couches on hand for those who need further assistance.
Here we go again. Remember “The Slants,” the Asian-American rock band who were denied a trademark based on their band name being “disparaging”? Simon Tam, the group’s lead singer, brought his case to the Supreme Court in 2017 and had the anti-disparaging law struck down unanimously. (That also resolved the PTO’s fight with the Washington Redskins.)
In Matal v. Tam, Cato and a basket of deplorable people and organizations, including political satirist P.J. O’Rourke and former ACLU president Nadine Strossen, filed a brief supporting the Slants and arguing that disparaging speech serves a valuable purpose, especially in rock music. Where would the world be without disparagingly named bands like N.W.A. or the Queers? Most importantly, the government can’t be trusted to decide what’s a slur.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/catos-latest-funny-brief
Here we go again. Remember “The Slants,” the Asian-American rock band who were denied a trademark based on their band name being “disparaging”? Simon Tam, the group’s lead singer, brought his case to the Supreme Court in 2017 and had the anti-disparaging law struck down unanimously. (That also resolved the PTO’s fight with the Washington Redskins.)
In Matal v. Tam, Cato and a basket of deplorable people and organizations, including political satirist P.J. O’Rourke and former ACLU president Nadine Strossen, filed a brief supporting the Slants and arguing that disparaging speech serves a valuable purpose, especially in rock music. Where would the world be without disparagingly named bands like N.W.A. or the Queers? Most importantly, the government can’t be trusted to decide what’s a slur.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/catos-latest-funny-brief
2019-04-17
Cato: Is This Infrastructure Really Necessary?
The United States has “at least $232 billion in critical public transportation” needs, claims the American Public Transportation Association (APTA). Among the “critically needed” infrastructure on APTA’s list are a streetcar in downtown Los Angeles, another one in downtown Sacramento (which local voters have rejected), one in Tempe, and streetcar extensions in Tampa and Kansas City.
Get real: even ardent transit advocates admit that streetcars are stupid. The economic development benefits that supposedly come from streetcars are purely imaginary, and even if they weren’t, it would be hard to describe streetcars – whose average speed, APTA admits, is less than 7.5 miles per hour – as “critically needed.”
Much of the nation’s transit infrastructure is falling apart, and the Department of Transportation has identified $100 billion of infrastructure backlog needs. (Page l – that is, Roman numeral 50 – of the report indicates a backlog of $89.9 billion in 2012 dollars. Converting to 2019 dollars brings this up to $100 billion.) Yet APTA’s “critical needs” list includes only $24 billion worth of “state of good repair” projects. Just about all of the other “needs” listed – $142 billion worth – are new projects or extensions of existing projects.
In fact, few if any of these new projects are “needed” – they are simply transit agency wish lists. For example, it includes $6 billion for phase 2 of New York’s Second Avenue Subway, but no money for rehabilitating New York’s existing, and rapidly deteriorating, subway system. Similarly, it includes $140 million for a new transitway in Alexandria, Virginia, but no money for rehabilitating the DC area’s also rapidly deteriorating Metrorail system. (In case anyone is interested, I’ve converted APTA’s project list into a spreadsheet for easy review and calculations.)
The $166 billion total on APTA’s “Project Examples” list is less than the $232 billion APTA says is needed, but even if all of the difference is “state of good repair” projects, that difference plus the $24 billion on APTA’s list doesn’t add up to what the DOT says is needed to restore transit infrastructure. This shows that even APTA doesn’t take public safety and “crumbling infrastructure” seriously.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/infrastructure-really-necessary
Get real: even ardent transit advocates admit that streetcars are stupid. The economic development benefits that supposedly come from streetcars are purely imaginary, and even if they weren’t, it would be hard to describe streetcars – whose average speed, APTA admits, is less than 7.5 miles per hour – as “critically needed.”
Much of the nation’s transit infrastructure is falling apart, and the Department of Transportation has identified $100 billion of infrastructure backlog needs. (Page l – that is, Roman numeral 50 – of the report indicates a backlog of $89.9 billion in 2012 dollars. Converting to 2019 dollars brings this up to $100 billion.) Yet APTA’s “critical needs” list includes only $24 billion worth of “state of good repair” projects. Just about all of the other “needs” listed – $142 billion worth – are new projects or extensions of existing projects.
In fact, few if any of these new projects are “needed” – they are simply transit agency wish lists. For example, it includes $6 billion for phase 2 of New York’s Second Avenue Subway, but no money for rehabilitating New York’s existing, and rapidly deteriorating, subway system. Similarly, it includes $140 million for a new transitway in Alexandria, Virginia, but no money for rehabilitating the DC area’s also rapidly deteriorating Metrorail system. (In case anyone is interested, I’ve converted APTA’s project list into a spreadsheet for easy review and calculations.)
The $166 billion total on APTA’s “Project Examples” list is less than the $232 billion APTA says is needed, but even if all of the difference is “state of good repair” projects, that difference plus the $24 billion on APTA’s list doesn’t add up to what the DOT says is needed to restore transit infrastructure. This shows that even APTA doesn’t take public safety and “crumbling infrastructure” seriously.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/infrastructure-really-necessary
2019-04-16
Cato: A Win on Student Speech in Rhode Island
The government can’t force people to promote messages they disagree with, even when – particularly when – the government actors are public university professors and the speaker is a student who needs to pass certain classes to get a degree.
William Felkner, a self-identified “conservative libertarian,” studied social work at Rhode Island College, a state school. His views unsurprisingly clashed with those of his professors, who consider the social work course – and the profession itself – to be “devoted to the value of social and economic justice.” In keeping with this philosophy, one of his professors assigned him to lobby the state legislature for a progressive bill.
Felkner refused to speak against his beliefs by lobbying in favor of progressive legislation. His term paper instead reflected his honest opinion of the bill. As a result, his professor gave him a failing grade and Felkner ultimately never completed the program.
That incident, in addition to a long string of events in which professors disparaged Felkner’s politics and tried to stifle his opinions, led him to sue the college. He argued, among several claims, that the school infringed on his right to free speech, compelled him to speak against his conscience, and placed unconstitutional conditions on his earning his degree.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/win-student-speech-rhode-island
William Felkner, a self-identified “conservative libertarian,” studied social work at Rhode Island College, a state school. His views unsurprisingly clashed with those of his professors, who consider the social work course – and the profession itself – to be “devoted to the value of social and economic justice.” In keeping with this philosophy, one of his professors assigned him to lobby the state legislature for a progressive bill.
Felkner refused to speak against his beliefs by lobbying in favor of progressive legislation. His term paper instead reflected his honest opinion of the bill. As a result, his professor gave him a failing grade and Felkner ultimately never completed the program.
That incident, in addition to a long string of events in which professors disparaged Felkner’s politics and tried to stifle his opinions, led him to sue the college. He argued, among several claims, that the school infringed on his right to free speech, compelled him to speak against his conscience, and placed unconstitutional conditions on his earning his degree.
Read more at https://www.cato.org/blog/win-student-speech-rhode-island
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